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I. INTRODUCTION: UNVEILING THE CORPORATE LAW
MYTHS EMBEDDED IN CITIZENS UNITED
From derivative suits to the derivative speech rights of
corporations recognized in Citizens United v. FEC,1 the watershed
2010 Supreme Court opinion that overturned restrictions on corporate
political speech in the form of independent expenditures, our law
takes inconsistent stances on how, for whose benefit, on whose behalf
corporations speak. The Citizens United opinion, which wrestled with
the boundaries of fundamental First Amendment rights and the extent
to which free speech protections should be extended to corporations,
is riddled with assumptions about corporations that are often divorced
from the economic and legal realities in which these entities exist.
This Article employs traditional corporate law principles (e.g.
fiduciary duties, corporate governance and securities regulations) to
challenge the foundational assumptions regarding corporate entities
that the Court relied on in concluding that corporate speech should be
treated the same as individual speech.
Corporate personhood is central to the determination of
corporations’ claim to First Amendment free speech rights. Courts
struggle to appropriately define, or, more accurately, conceptualize
corporations for the purpose of extending or denying constitutional
rights. The evolution of corporate personhood, culminating in
Citizens United, can be juxtaposed with the development of corporate
law in areas such as derivative suits, the proxy process, and SEC
regulations, which recognize the complexity of corporate speech.2
1
2

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
See Linda L. Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive
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The conceptualization of corporate speech in Citizens United—how it
is created, the ends that it serves, and the protection it should
receive—is inconsistent with conceptualizations of the corporate form
and a corporate “voice” in other areas of the law.
Examining the Supreme Court’s conceptualization of corporate
political speech in Citizens United reveals flaws in the Court’s
assumptions about how corporations speak that do not comport with
traditional corporate law principles. These flaws highlight the
differences between corporate and individual speech. A
conceptualization of corporate political speech that is grounded in
traditional corporate law principles challenges the assumptions
underlying the Court’s conclusion that corporate political speech
cannot be distinguished from individual speech and therefore may not
be regulated by Congress.3
The Citizens United Court ignored the following five realities of
corporate political speech: (1) corporate speech, even when political,
has an economic motivation; (2) there is no singular corporate voice;
(3) unrestricted corporate political speech poses a risk of compelled
speech; (4) corporate speech is already regulated based solely on the
identity of the corporate speaker; and (5) corporate law, in the form of
securities regulations, employs the equalization rationale.
This Article juxtaposes corporate law’s conceptualization and
regulation of corporate speech with the approach advanced in Citizens
United, and asks whether corporate law can help inform the
fundamental First Amendment debate regarding corporate political
speech. The answer appears to be yes because viewing the Citizens
United opinion through a corporate law lens reveals the five
fundamentally flawed assumptions listed above. The second Part of
this Article explores the historical development of corporate
constitutional rights, including the constitutional conceptualization of
Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS
169, 181–83 (2004) (analyzing the different entity theories used by legal scholars and the courts
to conceptualize the corporation as a single entity); see also Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the
Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L.
199, 202 n.7 (2010) (describing the different pieces of a corporation that, when put together,
form a cohesive picture).
3 In addition to invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b, Citizens United also reversed the
prohibition on unions from making independent campaign expenditures. This Article focuses
exclusively on the corporate law issues raised in the case and does not address the separate, but
related, issue of labor unions.
Additionally, qualifying nonprofit corporations organized under 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(3)
and 527, as well as corporations qualifying for the MCFL exemption, were exempted from the
prohibitions on corporate campaign expenditures under § 441b and are therefore outside of the
scope of the Citizens United holding and the issues addressed in this Article. See FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (establishing the MCFL exemption).
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corporations and the fundamental assumptions shaping the Court’s
view of corporate speech in Citizens United. The third Part analyzes
the majority opinion, identifying the conceptualization of
corporations it employs and the assumptions upon which it relies.
Finally, the fourth Part of this Article debunks the flawed corporate
law assumptions buttressing the Court’s conclusion that corporate
political speech is indistinguishable from individual speech.
II. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
THE ROAD TO CITIZENS UNITED
Citizens United v. FEC overturned the long legal history of
regulating corporate political speech—from the Tillman Act of 19074
to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.5 Initially unable to
reach a majority decision, the Supreme Court requested a rare
reargument of the case and revived a facial challenge to 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b.6 In the five-to-four opinion, the Court overturned § 441b’s
restriction on corporate independent expenditures and thus overruled
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,7 a major decision
4 Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006))
(banning “any corporation whatever” from making “a money contribution in connection with”
federal elections).
5 Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47
U.S.C.) (addressing the increased role of so-called “soft money” in campaign financing and the
proliferation of issue-advocacy advertisements); see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate
Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach
32–34 (Feb. 28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474421
(discussing the evolution of campaign finance laws from the Tillman Act and through the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act). See generally Kimberly Demarchi, Election Campaign
Funding After Citizens United, 46 ARIZ. ATT’Y 20, 20 (2010) (providing a historical background
of election contributions).
The Tillman Act was passed in response to President Theodore Roosevelt’s first State of
the Union Address calling for an absolute ban on contributions by corporations for any political
purpose, 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905), after allegations arose that his campaign for election had
accepted substantial corporate contributions. MARK GROSSMAN, POLITICAL CORRUPTION
IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCANDALS, POWER, AND GREED 271 (2003).
6 Adam Liptak, Case Could Overhaul Rules on Campaign Spending, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2009, at A12. Justice Stevens’ dissent highlights that Citizens United expressly abandoned
its facial challenge in its motion for summary judgment in the district court. Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Brief for Plaintiff, Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-2240)
(opposing FEC’s motion for summary judgment and supporting its own motion for summary
judgment). See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (prohibiting national banks, corporations, and labor
organizations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with certain elections); 2
U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(a)(i) (defining the term “electioneering communication”); Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit
advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to
broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a
general election.”).
7 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
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upholding corporate campaign expenditure restrictions.8 The thrust of
the Court’s argument was that independent expenditures—those made
by corporations and labor unions that are not coordinated with a
candidate or the candidate’s committee or party—do not raise
corruption concerns and therefore do not meet the strict scrutiny
threshold necessary to restrict speech otherwise protected by the First
Amendment.9
A. Evolving Constitutional Conceptualizations of Corporations
The Court’s evolving treatment of corporations has depended in
part on its view of them—the sources of their rights and their role in
society—and certain assumptions regarding how corporations
function. As those views have evolved, so too have the constitutional
protections afforded to corporations, including rights under the First
Amendment. In Citizens United and other corporate political speech
cases, the Court’s conceptualization of and assumptions about
corporations shape the outcomes. This Article identifies the
conceptualizations relied upon by the Court and deconstructs their
underlying assumptions.
The Supreme Court in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward10 articulated the artificial entity theory—the original
constitutional conceptualization of corporations—by stating, “A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence.”11 Under this view, corporations were routinely denied
constitutional protections.12
This rigid artificial entity theory softened into a second approach
that focused on corporations as possessing the aggregate rights of
8 Citizens United also overruled parts of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which
extended § 441b’s restrictions on corporate election expenditures.
9 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (“[W]e now conclude that independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.”). Earlier, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court had
reasoned that uncoordinated expenditures undermine the value of such speech to the candidate
and therefore decrease the threat of quid pro quo reciprocation from the candidate or elected
official. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
10 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
11 Id. at 636.
12 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 99 (1872) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (“But the court answered, that corporations were not citizens within the meaning of
this clause; that the term citizens as there used applied only to natural persons, members of the
body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature and
possessing only the attributes which the legislature had prescribed . . . .”).
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their shareholder-owners. “Viewed as a group of individuals or as a
real and discrete entity with attributes similar to those of a person, a
corporation gains First Amendment rights that are indistinguishable
from those of individuals.”13 This approach is often used in
connection with the argument that corporate political speech should
receive full First Amendment protection because it protects the rights
of the citizen-shareholders14 to speak through the corporation.15
This second, “aggregation approach” gave way to a third, more
aggressive and individualistic conceptualization of corporations,
which declared them autonomous and separate from both their
originating states’ laws and their shareholders.16 The evolving
Berger, supra note 2, at 182.
This article uses the phrase “citizen-shareholder” to discuss the questions of corporate
political participation raised in Citizens United because the case implicates the participatory
rights of citizens as well as their economic interests as shareholders. The comprehensive
category of shareholders of publically traded companies in the United States certainly includes
other groups such as non-citizen shareholders (i.e., those living and working here with a visa or
a green card) as well as foreign nationals who neither live nor work in this country.
15 See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellant at 13–17, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08205), 2009 WL 693638 (arguing that nonprofit corporation speech is funded mostly by
individuals); Brief of the American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
Citizens United at 12–14, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 132718
(arguing that Citizens United is comprised of individual donors); Brief of American Justice
Partnership and Let Freedom Ring as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12, Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2359479 (“To be heard effectively, individuals
with less financial wherewithal must pool their resources. If they seek to do so by forming a
corporation, Austin permits them to be silenced rather than heard.”); Brief of Fidelis Center for
Law and Policy and Catholicvote.Com as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner on Supplemental
Question at 9, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365209 (“Austin
endorsed what must be seen as an unconstitutional condition because the benefits of
incorporating now come at a price, i.e., shareholders are not free to use their corporate treasury
to fund political speech about candidates.”); Brief of National Rifle Ass’n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 15, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 147861
(arguing that First Amendment protects actions of individual donors acting in concert); Brief of
Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner on Supplemental Question at
16, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2349017 (“[C]orporations provide
‘individuals the ability to organize in a form that would allow them to engage efficiently in
collective action.’” (quoting Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion,
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1111 (2002))); see also
Larry Ribstein, Corporate Speech Is About Real People Speech, IDEOBLOG (Mar. 13, 2010, 3:26
PM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/citzens-united (“Citizens United is about the speech
rights of real people acting through associations. If you take away the speech rights of people
acting through associations, you have to decide which other types of associations you want to
apply that to. Unincorporated firms? The ACLU?”); cf. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential
Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1009 (1998) (“Several
theories of the corporation have been used to support the classification of the corporation on the
private, nongovernmental, individual side of the great liberal divide between state and civil
society. The oldest theory—conventionally referred to as the ‘aggregate’ theory—deemed the
corporation to be ‘really’ just its ‘members’ and, accordingly, entitled to the same protection the
‘members’ would have.”).
16 Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 580–81 (1990) (“[T]he ‘natural entity’ or person theory . . . regards the
corporation not as artificial, but as real, with a separate existence and independent rights. It is
13
14
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conceptualization of corporations has facilitated, in part, the trend to
extend constitutional protections to such entities.17 Today,
corporations enjoy the protection of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.18
The Citizens United opinion affirmed, in part, that corporations
enjoy First Amendment protections. Corporations, however, are not
mentioned in the Constitution; thus, the extension of such rights
depends on case law. Corporations, originally viewed as mere
creatures of state law with limited rights and powers (the artificial
entity theory), were routinely denied constitutional rights early in the
nineteenth century.19 For example, in the Slaughter-House Cases,20
the Supreme Court differentiated the rights of “naturalized” citizens
from those of corporations, which were state-created entities and
outside of the intended scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause.21 The court held

associated with continental theorists who, at the turn of the century, wrote about ‘group’ or
‘corporate’ personality in an effort to challenge individualism and to come to terms with
institutions of modern society such as corporations, trade unions, universities, and professional
associations. This understanding of the corporation most favors corporate constitutional rights.”
(footnote omitted)).
17 See LEE DRUTMAN & CHARLIE C RAY, THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS: C ONTROLLING
CORPORATIONS AND RESTORING DEMOCRACY 44–45 (2004) (discussing a corporation’s legal
status and constitutional protections).
18 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (applying the
Fifth Amendment protection from double jeopardy to corporations); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (“[T]he act imposing the tax in question is unconstitutional under the
due process of law clause because it abridges the freedom of the press . . . .”); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“We are also of opinion that an order for the production of books and
papers [of a corporation] may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth
Amendment.”); Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896)
(“It is now settled that corporations are persons within the meaning of the constitutional
provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.”); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28
(1889) (extending Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process to corporations); Bank of
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91–92 (1809) (establishing the right for a
corporation to bring an action in its own name); United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324,
1350 (D. Colo. 1984) (“The guarantees of the Sixth Amendment apply to corporate defendants
with the same force as to individual defendants.” (citing United States v. Rad-O-Lite of
Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979))), rev’d on other grounds, 821 F.2d 1456
(10th Cir. 1987).
19 Mayer, supra note 16, at 579–80.
20 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
21
[T]he court held, that a corporation, being a grant of special privileges to the
corporators, had no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where
created, and that the recognition of its existence by other States, and the
enforcement of its contracts made therein, depended purely upon the assent of those
States, which could be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States
might think proper to impose.
. . . The common privileges and immunities which of right belong to all citizens,
stand on a very different footing [from that of a corporation].
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that corporations were not citizens within the meaning of [the
Fourteenth Amendment]; that the term citizens as there used
applied only to natural persons, members of the body politic
owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created
by the legislature and possessing only the attributes which the
legislature had prescribed . . . .”22
The expanded conceptualization of a corporation as a legal person
that enjoys a nearly full panoply of rights began in 1886 with Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.23 In retrospect the
extension of constitutional rights to corporations was a sea-change
moment. It was accomplished, however, through a preargument
statement of Chief Justice Waite that was included in the court
reporter’s footnote to the oral-argument transcript.24 Since the Santa
Clara decision, the constitutional rights of corporations have been
recognized in several areas, particularly under the Bill of Rights.25
Corporations are entitled to freedom of speech under the First
Amendment, protection from unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment, freedom from double jeopardy under the Fifth
Amendment, counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and jury trials in
civil cases under the Seventh Amendment.26

Id. at 100 (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 80.
22 Id. at 99.
23 118 U.S. 394 (1886). At issue in Santa Clara County was whether California was
prohibited under the Due Process Clause from taxing a railroad company’s property differently
from that of an individual.
24 One of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for
defendants in error was that “Corporations are persons within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Before argument
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said: The court does not wish to hear argument on the
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it
does.
Id. at 396.
25 See Mayer, supra note 16, at 582 (“As late as 1960 the corporation arguably enjoyed
only the protection of the fifth amendment’s due process clause. Today, the corporation boasts a
panoply of Bill of Rights protections . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Corporations first received Bill
of Rights guarantees in 1893. In Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 165
(1893), a railroad corporation invoked the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to challenge
the Secretary of the Interior’s revocation of an approval for a right-of-way over federal public
lands. The Court invalidated this action, viewing it as an attempt to deprive the railroad
corporation of its property without due process. Id. at 176. “Although the Court in Noble did not
explain why the fifth amendment due process clause—as opposed to the fourteenth amendment
clause—should apply to corporations, no other interpretation is possible, because the defendant
was the federal government.” Mayer, supra note 16, at 591.
26 Berger, supra note 2, at 182 (“Corporations count as persons for the Fourth
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The initial denial of constitutional protections to corporations, as
well as the later extension of such protections, depended on the
Court’s conceptualization of corporations under corporate personhood
theories. In the 125 years since Santa Clara, the law’s view of
corporations in terms of legal philosophy has evolved so that
corporations are now considered either an aggregation of their
members, entitled to the aggregate rights of those members, or as an
entirely separate, free-standing entity entitled to constitutional and
other rights as legal persons.27 The majority in Citizens United
employed both the aggregation-of-rights and entity theory of
corporations to reach its conclusion that corporate political speech is
to be treated the same an individual political speech.
Even though the law has reached a tentative consensus that
corporations, as legal persons, have some rights, the law still deals
with corporations in a cumbersome and often inconsistent way. In
some areas, the law makes no distinction between the individual and

Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against double jeopardy, and the Seventh Amendment’s right to trial by jury in civil cases.”);
Mayer, supra note 16, at 578 (“The corporation’s invocation of the first ten amendments
symbolizes the transformation of our constitutional system from one of individual freedoms to
one of organizational prerogatives.”). Corporations, however, are not entitled to the Fifth
Amendment’s protection from self-incrimination. “[C]orporations, unlike individuals, can be
required to testify against themselves and have no right of privacy.” KENT R. MIDDLETON &
WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 288 (8th ed. 2011) (footnote omitted);
see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding that search of petitioner’s offices
for business records did not offend Fifth Amendment); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21 (1974) (holding that record-keeping and reporting requirements imposed on bank by Bank
Secrecy Act did not deprive bank of due process); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632 (1950) (holding that due process is not violated if inquiry is not too indefinite and
information sought is relevant).
For a discussion of Fifth Amendment protections (life, liberty, property) claimed by
corporations for regulatory takings, such as the recent case in which the Second Circuit held that
a Massachusetts law requiring the disclosure of tobacco ingredients constituted a regulatory
taking of the trade secret, see DRUTMAN & CRAY, supra note 17, at 58–61.
For a discussion of the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to corporations, see U.S. v.
Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d 546, 549–50 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that corporations have a right to
counsel but no right to appointed counsel should they be unable to afford to cost of retaining
counsel) and U.S. v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that corporations cannot be subject to interrogation outside the presence of counsel
after initiation of criminal proceedings).
27 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be
denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not ‘an individual American.’”). But
cf. id. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In the context of election to
public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although
they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it.”);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 53–60, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL
6325467 (discussing the interests of the corporate shareholder versus the corporation’s
individual interests).
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the corporation; yet in other circumstances, different treatment is
warranted by their apparent differences in structure, function, and role
in society. For example, tax treatment including the deduction of
expenses and the levels of taxation (“double” for corporations), issues
of criminal punishment, and the application of the commercial speech
doctrine primarily to corporate speech are but a few examples of the
unique treatment that corporations receive under the law.28 In
delineating the legal distinctions between corporate and individual
actors, the issue of speech from the corporate entity has long occupied
the Supreme Court and tested the rational limits of First Amendment
doctrines.
B. Constitutional Recognition of Corporate Political Voices
Before Citizens United, corporations were prohibited from making
direct candidate contributions and, for a certain time period before
primary and general elections, independent expenditures.29 Section
441b, which was struck down in part in Citizens United,30 made it
“unlawful for any . . . corporation organized by authority of any law
of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with
any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for
any political office.”31 Contributions and expenditures include
electioneering communications32 or their functional equivalent.33
28 See, e.g., 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4946 (perm ed., rev. vol. 2010) (“Even if it is accepted that a
corporation has the capacity to commit a particular crime, it cannot be indicted if the
punishment prescribed for the crime cannot be imposed upon a corporation. A corporation,
therefore, cannot be indicted for a felony where the only punishment provided is death or
imprisonment, since a corporation cannot be subject to either penalty.”); Herwig J. Schlunk, A
Minimalist Approach to Corporate Income Taxation, 59 SMU L. REV. 785 (2006) (discussing
the double-taxation method applied to corporations).
29 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
30 The ban on direct contributions by corporations in § 441b was not a part of the
constitutional challenge in Citizens United and remains good law. See Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. at 901 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, which upheld limits on direct contributions to
candidates).
31 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
32 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). This provision reads:

OF

For purposes of this section and section 79l(h) of title 15, the term
“contribution or expenditure” includes a contribution or expenditure, as those terms
are defined in section 431 of this title, and also includes any direct or indirect
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or
anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank made in
accordance with the applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary
course of business) to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or
organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this
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Electioneering communications means communications that are
publicly distributed and the term includes “any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication”34 that clearly identifies a federal election
candidate within sixty days of a general or thirty days of a primary
election.35
Even though corporations were restricted from making
independent expenditures before Citizens United,36 corporations still
had avenues available to them through which they could participate in
political speech. These avenues included: (1) contributions to political
action committees (PACs), (2) expenditures on direct lobbying
efforts, and (3) utilizing corporate funds to encourage employees to
support or oppose a particular candidate or issue.37 Additionally,

section or for any applicable electioneering communication, but shall not include
(A) communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or
administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members
and their families on any subject; (B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote
campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative
personnel and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and
their families; and (C) the establishment, administration, and solicitation of
contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a
corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or
corporation without capital stock.
Id.
33

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).
11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (2010).
35 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (“The term ‘electioneering communication’
means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which—(I) refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office; (II) is made within (aa) 60 days before a general, special or runoff
election for the office sought by the candidate or (bb) 30 days before a primary . . . to nominate
a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication
which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the
relevant electorate.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Thus, the following acts
would all be felonies under § 441b: The Sierra Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60
days before the general election, that exhorts the public to disapprove of a Congressman who
favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association publishes a book urging the
public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent U.S. Senator supports a handgun ban;
and the American Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for a
Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of free speech.”).
36 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold), Pub. L. 107–155,
116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.) (addressing the
increased role of soft money in campaign financing and the proliferation of issue-advocacy
advertisements).
Under § 441b, corporations were prohibited from “using general treasury funds to make
direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain
qualified federal elections.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
37 See MIDDLETON & LEE, supra note 26, at 302 (“Profit-making corporations . . . may
support PACs and engage in partisan communication—including advocating the election of
specific candidates—provided the communications are directed only to the corporate . . .
‘family.’ A corporation may use corporate funds to urge management, shareholders, and their
34
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§ 441b contained exemptions for media corporations38 and for
communications “by a section 501(c)(4) organization or a political
organization . . . if the communication is paid for exclusively by funds
provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or
nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”39 Thus,
corporations had access to the political marketplace and a voice in the
debate, although that voice was restricted.
In applying the First Amendment to corporations, four cases are
essential to understand the constitutional trajectory of the corporate
political speech doctrine prior to Citizens United:40 Buckley v.
Valeo,41 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,42 FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,43 and Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce.44 Emerging from these cases, are the key

families to vote for a specific candidate . . . .”).
38 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B) (“The term ‘expenditure’ does not include—(i) any news
story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or
controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate . . . .”).
39 Id. § 441b(c)(2). Nonprofit corporations that were formed solely to promote political
ideas, that did not collect funds from for-profit corporations, and that did not engage in business
activities were also exempted from the restrictions on corporate expenditures under § 441b. FEC
v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986).
40 A great deal of constitutional scholarship has been devoted to these cases and is not the
intended focus of this Article. Please note that there are several key First Amendment decisions
that are not included in this discussion. This Article is an attempt to infuse the First Amendment
debate with corporate law principles, not to conduct a survey of free speech cases. For a more
detailed discussion of the First Amendment case law leading up to Citizens United, see Michael
S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010).
41 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley established the distinction between restricting direct
contributions and indirect expenditures. The Court concluded that regulation was justified
because direct contributions could create quid pro quo relationships between donors and
recipient; the Court was also worried about the mere appearance of such corruption. Id. at 26–
27. Restrictions on expenditures, on the other hand, failed to survive strict scrutiny and were
struck down. Id. at 54.
42 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, the Court again confronted campaign restrictions, this
time in the context of a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited corporations from making
expenditures for ballot measures not related to their interests. Id. at 768. The statute contained a
presumption that income-tax measures were not related to the interests of corporations and
therefore corporations were prohibited from making expenditures related to tax issues on the
ballot. Id. The Court addressed whether speech by corporations had any less First Amendment
protection than the speech of natural persons and determined, at least with respect to direct
ballot issues, that there was no constitutional provision to support the distinction. Id. at 784–86.
43 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
44 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Austin upheld § 441b’s restrictions on independent corporate campaign expenditures, finding
that the regulation was narrowly tailored because it was not an outright ban on expenditures by
corporations, but merely a regulation on how they might be used. Id. at 659–60.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
876, was an extension of Austin. The Court upheld restrictions preventing corporations and
labor unions from using their general treasuries to make electioneering communications. Id. at
203–09.
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First Amendment metaphors and arguments regarding the
constitutional role of corporate political speech that framed the debate
in Citizens United.
In Buckley and Bellotti, the Court thwarted attempts to restrict
corporate political speech on the grounds that (1) speech is money;
(2) corporations contribute to the political marketplace of ideas;
(3) there is no special threat of distortion or need to equalize
individual and corporate voices; (4) corporate political speech
implicates freedom of association rights; and (5) concerns of
compelled shareholder speech do not justify restricting corporate
political speech. In subsequent cases such as Massachusetts Citizens
for Life (“MCFL”) and Austin, however, the Court utilized some of
these same arguments to explain or validate certain restrictions on
corporate political speech. Later, in Citizens United, however, the
Court employed the same lines of reasoning advanced in the cases
discussed below, to equalize corporate and individual speech thus
expanding corporate First Amendment rights. The Court’s application
of these common arguments—as either an attack against or support
for corporate political speech restrictions—depends on both the
Court’s constitutional conceptualization of corporations and its
assumptions about the roles, rights, and responsibilities of
corporations in our economic and legal society.
1. The Foundation: Spending Money Is a Protected Form of Speech
The determination that spending money in campaigns—through
either contributions or expenditures—is a form of constitutionally
protected speech or expression is a cornerstone in the First
Amendment debate regarding corporate political speech rights.45 In
Buckley, which upheld direct-campaign-contribution caps but struck
down similar restrictions on expenditures, the Court found for the
appellants, who argued that “limiting the use of money for political
purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the
First Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political
communications in the modern setting involve the expenditure of
money.”46 Because corporations can speak only through a conduit—
either a representative of the corporation or, even more indirectly,
through spending money—the recognition that money is a form of
speech is an essential element in recognizing First Amendment
protection of corporate political speech.47
45
46
47

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 11.
See Berger, supra note 2. That a corporation cannot speak directly but must speak
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2. The Marketplace of Ideas: A Shifting Metaphor to Both Extend and
Restrict Corporate Political Speech Rights
Second, in debating the political speech rights of corporations, the
Court has frequently employed the metaphor that the First
Amendment protects a marketplace of ideas.48 In Bellotti, the Court
struck down a Massachusetts law prohibiting corporate political
speech regarding ballot measures not related to the corporation’s
interests.49 Rather than making a determination about the independent
right of corporations to engage in political speech, the Court utilized a
marketplace-of-ideas justification to overturn the prohibition in
question. The Court reasoned that the First Amendment protects the
“stock of information from which members of the public may
draw,”50 and concluded that all speech benefits the citizen-recipients.
The Court refused to discount the contributions of speech from
corporations, asserting:
“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.” If the speakers here were
not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could
silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is
no less true because the speech comes from a corporation
rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.51

through a representative or use an indirect form of speech is represented by the ventriloquist
metaphor. This imagery is not entirely accurate, however, because a corporation is even further
removed from the speech than the ventriloquist speaking through a dummy. The corporation as
an entity does not control its own speech. Rather, the board of directors of the corporation
controls the speech. To be even more accurate, the board of directors would be the ultimate
puppet master pulling the strings of the ventriloquist who is speaking through the dummy. A
possible exception may be single-shareholder corporations, where the voice of the corporation is
the voice of the sole shareholder.
48 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257; First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
49 See supra note 42 (discussing Belotti).
50 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. The Court analogized corporate political speech to corporate
commercial speech. Id. at 766. Commercial speech—speech related to a commercial
transaction—is protected under the Constitution but receives only intermediate scrutiny. See,
e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770–73
(1976) (discussing how commercial speech can be regulated).
51 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–77 (second alternation in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
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In MCFL, the Court once again employed the marketplace-of-ideas
metaphor in analyzing the constitutional protections afforded to
corporate political speech when it exempted a nonprofit, nonstock
corporation from complying with the restrictions on corporate
expenditures contained in § 441b.52 The MCFL Court, however, used
the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor as a general justification to restrict
corporate speech, not as a means to strike down the regulation for the
benefit of the citizen-listeners as it had in past cases.53 The Court
described the rationale of § 441b as
the need to restrict “the influence of political war chests
funneled through the corporate form” . . . .
This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated
corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to
protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas. It
acknowledges the wisdom of Justice Holmes’ observation
that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”54
In exempting MCFL, the Court concluded that restricting the political
speech of this particular type of corporation did not serve the goals of
§ 441b, such as preserving the representative capacity of the
marketplace of political ideas as a barometer of public support for a
particular candidate or idea.55 In MCFL, the Court implied that
citizen-listeners have an interest not only in accessing different ideas
within the political marketplace, but also in preserving the
representative capacity of the marketplace so that the volume of such
speech bears some relationship to public support for it.56

52 In this case, the Court declined to extend the restrictions in § 441b to MCFL. The Court
concluded that the restrictions in § 441b were too “burdensome” where the rationales for the
restrictions were found to be largely inapplicable to a nonprofit, nonstock corporation that was
engaged in issue advocacy and received no corporate donations. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241–42.
53 Id. at 257.
54 Id. (second omission in original) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)); see also Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 416
(1972) (discussing how Congress sought to prevent union treasuries from influencing federal
elections); United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957) (discussing how Congress sought to reduce the political
influence of those with a large amount of capital).
55 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258.
56 See id. at 257 (concluding that corporate spending would not let the marketplace of
ideas function as an accurate indicator of public opinion).
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3. Limited Expenditures as a Means to Equalize Voices and Prevent
Overamplification of Corporate Voices
Related to the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor are the equalizationof-voices and antidistortion rationales alluded to by the Court in
MCFL. The equalization-of-voices and antidistortion rationales are
also key components of the Court’s analysis of corporate political
speech rights. The Court in Austin upheld restrictions on corporate
independent campaign expenditures,57 allowing a different standard to
be applied to corporate—as opposed to individual—political speech
because the corporate structure provided unique advantages that
might allow corporations to overpower the political voice of the
individual. The Court thus validated the antidistortion rationale in
Austin.58
Decades before Austin and MCFL, however, the Buckley Court
considered and rejected the equalization rationale—which advocates
limiting expenditures to level the political playing field. The Court
stated that the expenditure limits served “to mute the voices of
affluent persons and groups in the election process . . . to equalize the
relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections.” 59
The Court concluded that restricting “the quantity of campaign speech
by individuals, groups, and candidates” struck “at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.”60 Following
Buckley, the Court in Bellotti similarly rejected the equalization and
antidistortion rationales as being unsupported by the record.61 Instead
57 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
58 Id. at 660 (“[T]he unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth
can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures,
just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions.”).
59 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1976).
60 Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
61 In Bellotti, next in the progression of corporate political-speech cases, the Court
followed Buckley’s reasoning, stating:

Appellee advances a number of arguments in support of his view that these
interests are endangered by corporate participation in discussion of a referendum
issue. They hinge upon the assumption that such participation would exert an undue
influence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and—in the end—destroy the
confidence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of government.
According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may
drown out other points of view.
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978); see also id. at 789–90 (rejecting the
equalization and antidistortion rationales on the ground that there was “no showing that the
relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing
referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in
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of rejecting the rationales wholesale, the Court emphasized the lack of
a record justifying the restriction. Alerted to the need to develop a
record regarding distortion harms to support expenditure limits,
Congress did so in passing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.62
Those restrictions were subsequently recognized as valid in MCFL
and Austin.63
Thus, the equalization-of-voices and antidistortion rationales,
initially rejected in Buckley and Bellotti, were subsequently
recognized as valid justifications for restricting corporate political
speech in MCFL and Austin. Citizens United, discussed further in Part
III, abandoned the reasoning of MCFL and Austin and returned to the
Court’s original position in Buckley and Bellotti by rejecting these
rationales. Freedom of association, the right of an individual to speak
through a voluntary association, is a key element of later arguments
such as those made in Citizens United to protect corporate political
speech as a means to give full voice their citizen-shareholders.
Corporate political speech rights are thus viewed as a means to fulfill
the mandate of the freedom of association clause of the First
Amendment and is based on the aggregate-rights theory of
corporations discussed above.
4. Freedom to Associate as a Justification for Collective Corporate
Political Speech: An Aggregate Theory View of Corporate Speech
A fourth theme in the Court’s historical analysis of corporate
political speech rights is the interplay between freedom of association
and freedom of speech when citizens speak through their
organizations, including for-profit corporations.
In Buckley, the Court raised the notion that spending money in a
political campaign, whether through a direct contribution or an
expenditure, also implicates the associational rights of individuals.64
The Court asserted that capping independent expenditures in
campaigns burdens freedom of speech because it “precludes most
associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents,

government” (footnote omitted)).
62 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (“Congress recodified § 610’s corporate and
union expenditure ban at 2 U.S.C. § 441b four months after Buckley was decided. Section 441b
is the independent expenditure restriction challenged here.” (citation omitted)); H.R. REP. 107131, at 4 (2001) (identifying the disclosure of sponsors of communications as the only
government interest that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act serves).
63 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
64 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22–23.
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the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection
of the freedom of association.”65 Utilizing an aggregate theory of
politically active organizations, the Court concluded that restricting
independent associations’ expenditures of money in political
campaigns unjustifiably interfered with the constitutional rights of the
members of those associations.66
5. The Threat of Compelled Speech: The Shareholder Protection
Rationale
The fifth important element in the Court’s constitutional analysis
of corporate political speech rights is the shareholder protection
rationale, which argues that corporate political speech should be
restricted to prevent the threat of compelled speech among a
heterogeneous group of shareholders. In Bellotti, the Court rejected
Massachusetts’s justification for its law prohibiting corporate
participation in ballot measures. Massachusetts had argued that the
law was justified because it prevented shareholders from being forced
by economic concerns to give voice to opinions they themselves did
not hold.67 The Court reasoned that mechanisms of corporate
democracy, such as shareholder election of the board of directors,
provided adequate protection against such concerns.68 Ultimately,
however, the Court rejected the shareholder protection rationale
because it was both over- and underinclusive—including speech that
could comport with citizen-shareholder views and excluding other
types of potentially politically incongruent activity, such as lobbying
or making independent expenditures on behalf of campaigns.69
The Court returned to compelled shareholder speech in Austin,
where it reversed its earlier position on the shareholder protection
rationale. The Austin Court prohibited general corporate treasuries
65 Id. at 22. The Buckley Court, however, upheld limits on direct campaign contributions
because even though they limited the amount of financial support an individual could lend to a
candidate or committee, they left “the contributor free to become a member of any political
association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates.” Id.
66 Id. (“The Act’s constraints on the ability of independent associations and candidate
campaign organizations to expend resources on political expression ‘is simultaneously an
interference with the freedom of [their] adherents.’” (alternation in original) (quoting Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion))).
67 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792–93 (1978).
68 Id. at 794–95 (“Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of
corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on public issues.
Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions
in the corporation’s charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own
interests.” (footnote omitted)).
69 Id. at 793–95. It bears noting that in Citizens United Justice Kennedy rejected the
shareholder protection rationale, relying on the same over- and underinclusive reasoning
employed by the Court in Bellotti. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
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from funding political speech that could be inconsistent with the
views of their citizen-shareholders, recognizing (in dicta) concerns
regarding compelled speech of shareholders.70
These five elements of the Court’s historical First Amendment
analysis of corporate political speech rights—spending money is
speech; corporate speech influences the marketplace of ideas;
corporate and individual voices compete; corporate political speech
implicates the freedom to associate; and corporate political speech
threatens to compel speech—were all revived in the Citizens United
opinion and shaped by the Court’s conceptualization of and
assumptions regarding corporations.
III. IDENTIFYING THE CORPORATE
POLITICAL VOICE IN CITIZENS UNITED
Having examined the different theoretical conceptualizations of
corporations employed in First Amendment cases leading up to
Citizens United and the Court’s history of analyzing corporate
political speech, the next step is to examine the Court’s
conceptualization of corporations and the theory of a corporate
political voice employed by the majority in Citizens United. Justice
Kennedy utilized both the artificial-entity and aggregate-rights
theories to conceptualize corporations and strike down corporate
independent expenditure bans.71 The majority ultimately based its
ruling on the findings that: independent expenditures are
uncoordinated with the candidate; they pose no threat of corruption or
the appearance of corruption; and they therefore do not serve the
government’s purported compelling interest in restricting such
70 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 673 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (“[T]he Michigan law protects
dissenting shareholders of business corporations that are members of the Chamber to the extent
that such shareholders oppose the use of their money, paid as dues to the Chamber out of
general corporate treasury funds, for political campaigns.” (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260–61 (1986))); cf. id. at 686–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
shareholder of a for-profit corporation should expect the management to take any action that the
majority wants—as long as it is designed to make a profit—regardless of whether the
shareholder himself finds it “politically or ideologically uncongenial”).
Note that there were no shareholders in the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the group
challenging the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s restriction on corporate independent
campaign expenditures. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the members of the Chamber of
Commerce were more like shareholders in a corporation than members in a traditional
organization. “Although the Chamber also lacks shareholders, many of its members may be
similarly reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with the Chamber’s political
expression, because they wish to benefit from the Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to
establish contacts with other members of the business community.” Id. at 663 (majority
opinion).
71 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
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speech.72 In reaching its decision, the Court overturned Austin, which
had found that the unique threat of corporate political speech
warranted certain governmental restrictions.73 The holding of Citizens
United, therefore, was not limited to the issue of direct contributions
versus indirect expenditures. It extended to the much broader question
of the proper constitutional treatment of corporate political speech. In
reaching its decision, the Court drew on the First Amendment
metaphors and arguments developed in the rich line of corporate
political speech cases discussed above, and it adopted conflicting
conceptualizations of corporations in order to craft its conclusion.
In concluding that the government cannot restrict corporate
independent expenditures based solely on the corporate identity of the
speaker, Justice Kennedy relied on the following two
conceptualizations of the corporation: (1) the voice of a corporation is
just as valuable to a voter as the voice of an individual which reflects
the entity theory approach; and (2) corporations are protected
“associations” of individuals under the First Amendment’s Freedom
of Association Clause which reflects the aggregation-of-rights theory.
The Court questioned the distinction between corporate political
speech and individual political speech, noting, “[s]peech restrictions
based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means
to control content.”74 This conclusion was framed using the
marketplace-of-political-ideas metaphor. Citing Buckley and Bellotti,
Justice Kennedy concluded that the speech of a corporation is no less
valuable to the voter than the speech of an individual, and that it
therefore cannot be subject to restrictions.75 “The First Amendment
does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based
on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political
speech.”76 This reasoning returned the corporate political speech
72 Id. at 910 (“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the
electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political
speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.” (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976))).
73 Id. at 913.
74 Id. at 899.

Personhood has been ‘a conclusion, not a question.’ Referring metaphorically
to the corporation as a person allows the decision-maker to treat the corporation as if
it were identical for all purposes to individual human beings. Referring
metaphorically to the marketplace of ideas suggests that the corporation needs
protection from government regulation because its voice is necessary to the debate
from which truth will emerge.
Berger, supra note 2, at 186 (footnote omitted).
75 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912.
76 Id. at 913.
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doctrine to its original place by framing the issues in terms of
Bellotti’s marketplace of political ideas, where the potential value of
any speech to the citizen-listener prevents restrictions—even on
corporate speakers.77 Additionally, the Citizens United Court rejected
the equalization-of-voices and antidistortion rationales—that
regulation is justified by the risk that corporate voices will drown out
individual voices—adopted in MCFL and Austin.
Arguing that “[o]n certain topics corporations may possess
valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors
or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates
and elected officials,”78 the Court disavowed any discount of
corporate political speech in the marketplace of ideas.79 In reaching
its conclusion, the Court conceptualized corporations as artificial
entities that have a right to speak in the political arena independent of
their members’ right.80 Thus, the Court’s application of the entity
theory advanced its argument that corporate political speech is
constitutionally protected.
The Court concluded, “[t]he purpose and effect of [§ 441b] is to
prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations,
from presenting both facts and opinions to the public.”81 The Court
viewed the expenditure restrictions in § 441b as eroding the
marketplace of political ideas. The Court opined that Austin and its
progeny, including the language adopted in the Bipartisan Campaign
77 See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978) (“The inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”). But see FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (“This concern over the corrosive influence of
concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity
of the marketplace of political ideas.”). The marketplace-of-political-ideas metaphor has also
been criticized for protecting speech that serves no democratic function but harms the social
fabric, and for having an “inevitable bias” that supports the entrenched power structures of
ideologies. Berger, supra note 2, at 188.
78 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912.
79 Cf. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 (“We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth
Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise
would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its
source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its
business or property. The “materially affecting requirement . . . amounts to an impermissible
legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesman may
represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a
sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.”).
80 See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1000 (arguing that in collapsing the corporate
form into the individuals standing behind it, the courts gloss over the important organizational
distinctions between corporations and individuals in terms of evaluating First Amendment
rights). For the argument that there should not be First Amendment protections for
commercially motivated speech because it does not serve the goal of self-expression, see C.
Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3
(1976).
81 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907.
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Reform Act, “interfere[] with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas
protected by the First Amendment. [They] permit[] the Government
to ban the political speech of millions of associations of citizens.
Most of these are small corporations without large amounts of
wealth.”82 In this line of reasoning the Court appeared to adopt some
of the equalization-of-voices concern underpinning the antidistortion
argument. But instead of employing it in the context of the individual
versus a corporation, the Court employed it in the context of large
versus small corporations. The Court combined historical corporate
political speech arguments—the marketplace-of-political-ideas and
equalization rationales—with an entity-theory conceptualization of
corporations in order to reach its conclusion that corporate political
expenditures could not be restricted under the First Amendment.
Demonstrating the Court’s inconsistent view of corporations is its
simultaneous adoption of the aggregation-of-rights-theory
conceptualization of corporations in Citizens United. Under this
theory, corporations possess the aggregate rights of their citizenshareholder.83 The Court thus conceptualized corporations as
associations of citizens, who are unquestionably protected under the
First Amendment.84 The Court rejected the idea that citizen
“membership” through stock ownership in a publicly held corporation
should be treated differently from citizen membership in any other
type of organization.85
The constitutional scope of the first amendment includes a
protection of the right to free association. The government
cannot prevent free people from joining private organizations.

Id. at 906–07 (citations omitted).
Instead of thinking about corporate functioning, corporate sociology, or corporate law,
and then considering how constitutional norms designed to protect citizens from the power of
the state should apply to powerful nonstate organizations, the Court often has seen its task as
determining whether corporations are “persons” entitled to protection from the state. In general,
the Court has concluded that they are. See Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1006, 1009 (“Several
theories of the corporation have been used to support the classification of the corporation on the
private, nongovernmental, individual side of the great liberal divide between state and civil
society. The oldest theory—conventionally referred to as the ‘aggregate’ theory—deemed the
corporation to be ‘really’ just its ‘members’ and, accordingly, entitled to the same protection the
‘members’ would have.”).
84 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
85 Cf. Nicholas Wolfson, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 288
(1988) (“Membership in a publicly-held corporation should rest on the same constitutional
plateau as membership in other organizations.”).
82
83
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Neither can the government enjoin the speech individuals use
in connection with their right to free association.86
By categorizing corporations under the same headings as any other
organization—artistic, political, community based, etc.—the Court set
the stage to fully protect corporate speech as an extension of the
rights of the citizen-shareholders standing behind the corporation.87
“The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under
the First Amendment simply because such associations are not
‘natural persons.’”88 By framing the right of corporations to engage in
political speech as an extension of the association and free speech
rights of their citizen-shareholders, the Court returned to the
aggregate theory of corporations and the line of reasoning first
employed in Buckley and Bellotti.
Additionally, the Court refused to discount the constitutional status
of corporations as First Amendment protected associations merely
because corporations are organized for commercial purposes.89 The
Court reasoned that corporate “speech cannot be distinguished based
upon the presence or lack of economic motive. That would eliminate
most speech from first amendment coverage. Likewise, if one
eliminates the right to association from economically interested
groups, one would eliminate most groups, with the possible exception
of the purest religious groups.”90
The majority opinion in Citizens United highlighted the Court’s
inconsistent conceptualization of corporations under the First
Amendment drawing upon both entity and aggregate views of the
corporate form. In reaching its conclusion to overturn § 441b’s ban on
Id. at 286–87 (footnotes omitted).
In this imaginary marketplace of ideas, as in Lochner’s imaginary market, all is
necessarily for the best in this best of all possible worlds, provided only that legislatures are
barred from interfering on behalf of market losers. Those who win deserve to win. Any attempt
to legislate different rules that might generate different winners is a violation of secularly sacred
rules of the game. In short—and particularly since markets operate by the ancient principle that
to those who have much, much will be given—might makes right. See Greenwood, supra note
15, at 1017 (describing the shift in First Amendment theory that resulted in understanding it as a
“Lochnerian enactment of a free market of information”).
88 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
89 It is important to note that there are nonprofit corporations, single-shareholder
corporations, and corporations formed solely to serve political ends, which are all excluded from
the arguments made herein. These subsets of corporations can be dealt with through exemptions
or exceptions to any campaign-finance law and are therefore largely outside of the scope of this
Article.
90 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 287. “If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits
Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in
political speech.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
86
87
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independent corporate campaign expenditures, the Court employed
both the entity theory, reasoning that corporate political speech has
the same value as individual speech in the marketplace of ideas,91 and
the aggregate-rights theory, reasoning that corporations are protected
associations.92 The Court’s shifting conceptualization of corporations
and its flexible application of historical First Amendment arguments
create an inconsistent doctrine of corporate political speech rights.
The malleability of the Court’s views of corporations stems from its
flawed assumptions about the economic, political, and legal realities
of corporations.
IV. FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS: INSERTING CORPORATE LAW
INTO THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEBATE IN CITIZENS UNITED
Citizens United held that independent expenditures that are not
coordinated with the candidate pose no threat, or the appearance of a
threat, of corruption; and therefore there is no constitutionally
sufficient justification for restricting such expenditures.93 The Court
discarded any First Amendment distinction based on the corporate
identity of the speaker reasoning that corporations enjoy the same
First Amendment protections and rights to participate as individuals.
The thrust of the majority opinion, however, was built upon flawed
assumptions regarding the constitutional rights of corporations and
their role within society and the marketplace of political ideas.
In evaluating the fundamental First Amendment arguments for and
against the constitutional protection of corporate political speech, the
Court engaged in a discussion about corporations and their role in our
political system without reference to principles of corporate law or
their ensuing realities. Introducing these fundamental principles into
the Court’s First Amendment debate reveals the flawed assumptions
underlying its shifting conceptualization of corporations, which led it
to conclude that corporate political speech is indistinguishable from
individual political speech.94 Applying a corporate law perspective to
91
92
93
94

Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 910.
The Court’s assumptions regarding corporations are foundational elements to its ruling

because
nonlegal factors, far more than legal ones, determine which opportunistic
claims to First Amendment attention will succeed and which will not. Legal doctrine
and free speech theory may explain what is protected within the First Amendment’s
boundaries, but the location of the boundaries themselves—the threshold
determination of what is a First Amendment case and what is not—is less a doctrinal
matter than a political, economic, social, and cultural one.
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the Citizens United debate, five points for discussion emerge: (1) the
economic motivation of corporate speech, (2) the lack of a single
corporate voice, (3) the threat of compelled speech, (4) the prevalence
of existing regulation of corporate speech, and (5) the applicability of
the equalization rationale to corporate speech.
A. Economic Motivation of Corporate Speech
The Court in Citizens United refused to discount corporate
political speech from individual speech because of the economic
motivation present in corporate speech. Justice Kennedy wrote, “All
speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed
from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First
Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by
economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the
speaker’s ideas.”95 A traditional corporate law analysis of corporate
political speech, however, reveals that when corporations “speak” in
any arena, commercial or political, they do so with an economic
motivation. Pursuant to Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,96 corporations owe
their shareholders a singular fidelity to maximizing shareholder
wealth in the form of corporate returns.97
Corporations have an additional and significantly different set
of problems: they are legally required to represent not a group
of people but a legally defined set of interests—the interests
of a fictional creature called a shareholder that has no
associations, economic incentives or political views other
than a desire to profit from its connection with this particular
corporation.98

Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (2004).
95 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 707 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
96 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
97 Id. at 682; see also Wolfson, supra note 85, at 288 (discussing the stock corporation’s
duty to make a profit for its shareholders). Shareholder wealth maximization as a principle of
corporate law is a mechanism to align the interests of corporate managers (directors and
officers) with the interests of the shareholder owners. E.g., Hector Rocha, People, Firms and
Society: Three Proposals for Aligning Personal Motives, Firm’s Goals and Societal Needs (Nov.
4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295193; cf. M. Todd
Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Company (The
Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 373,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070284 (arguing that the shareholder-wealthmaximization rationale of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is overemphasized and mistaught).
98 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1033.
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The economic nature of corporate speech, however, was largely
ignored in the Court’s analysis of corporate political speech in
Citizens United. Corporate speech is given no discount for its
economic motivation and is treated as equal to the speech of an
individual.99
The Court discussed the economic influence on corporate speech
only in the context of the antidistortion rationale of Austin, which the
Court overturned.100 Relying on Buckley, which “rejected the premise
that the Government has an interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections,’” the
Court abandoned the antidistortion rationale.101 The Court reasoned
that all speakers, whether corporations or individuals, amass within
the economic marketplace the wealth necessary to fund political
speech. The Court found the unique economic structure of a
corporation to be irrelevant in determining the scope of First
Amendment protection for its speech.102
Citizens United left unexamined questions such as whether the
economic speech of corporations should be discounted within the
marketplace of political ideas. How should we reconcile the
marketplace of commodities within the context of the marketplace of
the mind? By treating individual and corporate speech equally
because both “persons” must obtain the necessary funds through
economic endeavors, the Court glosses over important distinctions
between the economic nature of corporations as legal persons and that
of individuals.
Certainly, from a marketplace-of-ideas perspective, listeners
benefit from all viewpoints expressed in the marketplace regardless of
the source.103 Additionally, the line between economic and political
99 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” (quoting First Nat’l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).
Utilizing the personhood metaphor simplifies the analysis of corporate speech rights
because it “diverts attention away from the differences among forms of organization and from
the different treatments that should result.” Berger, supra note 2, at 186–87.
100 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903–06.
101 Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)). “Austin found a
compelling governmental interest in preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’” Id. at 903
(quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
102 Id. at 905.
103 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (“The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such
political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (“This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate

3/1/2011 6:30:55 PM

2011]

FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS

521

speech is easily blurred. For example, one can imagine an activist
writing a politically inspired book; that speech would be considered
political in nature. Once the book begins earning royalties, or once the
author begins giving paid talks or readings, however, the speech takes
on an economic element.104 There is no way to completely eradicate
the economic speech elements from political speech or vice versa.
The economic motivations of individual political speech can be
distinguished from that of a corporation, however, in several
structural respects. First, corporations have a greater ability to
accumulate wealth beyond capacities of an individual due to their (1)
perpetual life span of a corporation, (2) resource-pooling abilities of
corporations, and (3) special tax rates and tax breaks.105 The majority
in Citizens United, however, rejected the argument that these
structural differences warranted different treatment under the First
Amendment.106 “All speakers, including individuals and the media,
use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their
speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it
was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who
disagree with the speaker’s ideas.”107

wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of
political ideas.”); cf. Berger, supra note 2, at 188 (arguing that the marketplace-of-ideas
metaphor includes a bias for existing power and ideological structures within society); Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1984) (asserting
that the theoretical underpinnings of the marketplace-of-ideas model of the First Amendment
are based on assumptions of rational decision making that are implausible in modern society).
104 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 270–73.
105 “The term ‘perpetual succession’ is not generally construed to imply corporate
immortality, but rather a continuity of existence, irrespective of that of its component members,
limited in duration to the period stated in its charter or the act authorizing the granting of it.” 1
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 6 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2010) (footnote omitted); see also Erik Devos et al.,
How Do Mergers Create Value? A Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency
Improvements as Explanations for Synergies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1179 (2009) (discussing the
sources of merger gains); Scott D. Dyreng et al., Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance, 83 ACCT.
REV. 61 (2008) (describing a new measure of long term corporate tax avoidance).
106 Either as support for its antidistortion rationale or as a further argument, the Austin
majority undertook to distinguish wealthy individuals from corporations on the ground that
[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets.” This does not suffice, however, to allow laws prohibiting speech. “It is
rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the
forfeiture of First Amendment rights.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990) and Austin, 494 U.S. at 680
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
107 Id. (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
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Second, the structural advantages of corporations to amass wealth
are exacerbated by the mandate of for-profit corporations to maximize
profits.108 While economic interests may also primarily motivate an
individual, an individual will never face potential liability for failing
to singularly advance economic interests, even in the context of
political speech.109 A corporation faces this threat in the form of
derivative suits alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. Corporate speech,
even in the political realm, is motivated primarily by an economics
incentive.110 Failure to adhere to this mandate exposes the corporate
entity to liability that an individual would never face for political
expression. The constant, mandated fidelity to economic motivation,
even in the context of political expression, distinguishes corporate
speech from that of an individual.
Third, the economic motivation of corporate political speech is
similar to the economic motivation recognized in commercial speech.
As discussed above, in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy
conceptualized corporations as “associations” of individuals, equating
the right to form a predominantly economic entity with the First
Amendment right to associate in political, artistic, or pleasureoriented organizations. This debate mirrors some of the issues
presented in the debate over the scope of constitutional protection
afforded commercial speech, the predominant form of corporate
speech.111 Commercial speech, first recognized in Virginia State
108 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”); see also
Kroese v. Gen. Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1950) (noting that courts have the
power to order a corporation’s board of directors to pay dividends if it is shown that they are in
violation of the business judgment rule); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch.
1986) (“It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run
interests of the corporation’s stockholders . . . .”). But see Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) (challenging the idea that
corporations exist only to make money for shareholders).
109 See Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(upholding State Farm’s policy not to issue dividends over a fifteen-year period as within the
penumbra of the business judgment rule despite being challenged in a class-action lawsuit by
policyholders alleging that failure to pay such dividends violated the company’s duty to
maximize profits for the policyholders); Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682 (stating that courts will not
interfere with the decisions of corporate directors unless they commit fraud or misappropriation
of corporate funds, or, under limited circumstances, refuse to declare dividends); see also
Churella v. Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co., 671 N.W.2d 125 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that
policyholders failed to sufficiently plead facts to overcome the business judgment rule in
connection with directors’ failure to distribute surplus because they did not establish that a
failure to declare a dividend was an abuse of business discretion).
110 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1004 (“[C]orporate speech is better understood as the
expenditure of money in accordance with dictates of the law and the market on behalf of the
imaginary interests of a legal fiction: the fictional shareholder.”).
111 Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a conviction for the
distribution of a double-faced handbill that contained a political protest on one side and an
advertisement on the other), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
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Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,112
receives limited constitutional protection. It is defined as expression
that proposes a commercial transaction that is related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and his or her audience, or which is
likely to influence consumers in their commercial decisions.113 It
usually involves, but is not limited to advertising products for sale.
For example, communication regarding the price and attributes of a
consumer production and speech directed solely to the collection of a
debt are both purely commercial.114 Commercial speech, while
protected under the Constitution, is not treated the same as
noncommercial speech. “[T]he distinctions between the two
categories of speech justify subjecting governmental regulations of
commercial speech to a review less strict than that applied to
regulations of political speech.”115
The commercial speech doctrine is relevant to the current debate
because unlike the analysis undertaken in Citizens United, it
recognizes the distorting nature of economically motivated speech
(often from corporations), which it uses as a basis to treat such speech

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (holding
unconstitutional a Virginia statute penalizing an advertisement for abortion services in another
state), and N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that the First
Amendment is applicable to an advertisement in a corporation’s newspapers).
112 425 U.S. 748.
113 See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair
Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 47–60 (2005) (examining the different
standards of review applied to commercial and noncommercial speech). Prior to Virginia
Pharmacy, commercial speech was thought to be outside of the protections of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (“We are equally clear that the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”). Now, it
is commonly accepted that commercial speech falls within the ambit of the First Amendment.
See, e.g., 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 499 (2009) (“For First Amendment purposes,
commercial speech is an expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience, generally in the form of commercial advertisement for the sale of goods and
services, or speech proposing a commercial transaction.” (footnotes omitted)).
114 See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 812 (2005) (“Speech is not rendered commercial
by the mere fact that it relates to advertisement, that the speaker is a corporation, or that it
criticizes a product.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566–68 (1980) (holding that the fact that an electrical utility held
a monopoly on the sale of electricity in its service area did not establish that its advertising was
not protected by the First Amendment). Under the Central Hudson test, speech that is false,
misleading, or that concerns an unlawful activity receives no First Amendment protection
because the listeners do not have an interest in such speech. For speech that concerns a lawful
activity and is not misleading, then the restriction must pass intermediate scrutiny. The test is
whether the regulation directly advances a substantial government interest and is not more
extensive than necessary to advance that interest. Id. at 566.
115 Caren Schmulen Sweetland, Note, The Demise of a Workable Commercial Speech
Doctrine: Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to Commercial Disclosure
Requirements, 76 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1998).
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differently.116 That distinction, or discount, for economic motivations
is largely abandoned—without justification—in the context of
corporate political speech.117
Not only is the economic motivation of commercial speech a
distinguishing factor that warrants a lesser degree of constitutional
protection, but such speech may not fully serve the ends intended by
the First Amendment (e.g., expression, participation, accountability of
government, etc.).118 Edwin Baker and others have advanced the
argument that profit-oriented speech warrants differential treatment
under the First Amendment on the ground that it does not advance the
goals of liberty and self-realization served by “pure” forms of free
speech.119

116 Commercial speech regulations mirror election law in distinguishing between
disclosure requirements (presumptively valid) and prohibitions of speech (presumptively
invalid). See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down a
state law prohibiting advertisements by attorneys, but upholding disclosure requirements). But
see Wolfson, supra note 85, at 277–78 (discussing Zauderer and arguing that the Court’s
“attempted distinction between mandatory disclosure and outright prohibition cannot survive
analysis”).
117 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (“The First Amendment protects the
resulting speech, even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who
disagree with the speaker’s ideas.” (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 707 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting))).
118 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (“In
the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to
fulfill its essential role in our democracy.”); see also Sweetland, supra note 115, at 474
(“Political speech was deemed the sole embodiment of the free speech doctrine, and it was
given a preferred position among all constitutional rights because of the essential role it plays in
the operation of a constitutional democracy.” (footnote and internal quotations omitted)); G.
Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in
Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 327–33 (1997) (discussing the preferred
position enjoyed by political speech, as opposed to commercial speech, because of its role in
advancing democratic ideals).
119 In our present historical setting, however, commercial speech is not a manifestation of
individual freedom or choice; unlike the broad categories of protected speech, commercial
speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect the world in a way that can be expected
to represent anyone’s private or personal wishes. Therefore, profit-motivated commercial
speech lacks the crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization, which exist for
speech generally and which are central to justifications for the constitutional protection of
speech—justifications which in turn define the proper scope of protection under the First
Amendment. Baker, supra note 80, at 3; see also First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
804–05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting), quoted in C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and
Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 986 (2009) (“[W]hat some have considered to be the
principal function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of selfexpression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech. It is
clear that the communications of profitmaking corporations . . . do not represent a manifestation
of individual freedom or choice.” (footnote omitted)); Wolfson, supra note 85, at 269 (“A
suggested rationale for the difference between the limited protection of commercial speech and
the greater protection of political-artistic speech is the crucial role political-artistic speech plays
in free democratic society. Political speech is essential for the workings of a free democratic
society.” (footnote omitted)).
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Additionally, harkening back to the marketplace-of-ideas imagery
utilized by the majority in Citizens United (and throughout prior
corporate political speech cases), the rights of the citizen-listener
justify granting the corporation free speech protection under the
assumption that such expression serves the democratic ends of the
listener.120 However, borrowing from the commercial speech
perspective, speech that is essentially economic in nature should be
subject to additional regulations because of its potential to mislead the
listener.121 The distortion potential of an economic message
masquerading as a political message may warrant differential First
Amendment treatment. At a minimum, the distinction deserved
consideration by the Court in Citizens United, although it received
none.122
An analysis of corporate law principles leads to the conclusion that
when corporations speak, it is speech of an economic—not a
political—nature, due to corporations’ singular fidelity to profit
maximization.123 The Court should not have ignored this key
distinction between corporate and individual speech in Citizens
United. The Court left unexamined questions such as how economic
speech should be discounted in the marketplace of political speech.
Because economic motivation is inherent in all corporate political
speech, it has the potential to mislead consumers (i.e., voters) and it
may not advance the goals of a participatory democracy. Therefore,
the protection afforded such speech should be carefully examined.
The discount applied to economically motivated speech in other
arenas, such as commercial speech, should be similarly applied to
corporate political speech.
B. Fallacy of One Corporate Voice
Friedrich Hayek, the legal theorist, asserted that although an
individual can act unjustly, a society cannot; theoretically, some
individual must have acted unjustly on behalf of the society.124
120 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896 (concluding that “society . . . is deprived of
an ‘uninhibited marketplace of ideas’” when people choose to abstain from protected speech
rather than vindicate their rights through litigation (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119
(2003)).
121 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566–68 (1980).
122 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 27, at 47–48.
123 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (holding that the primary
goal of a corporation is profit maximization).
124 See C.R. McCann, Jr., F.A. Hayek: The Liberal as Communitarian, 15 REV. AUSTRIAN
ECON. 5, 20 (2002) (“To Hayek, ‘only situations which have been created by human will can be
called just or unjust,’ and so justice ‘always implies that some person or persons ought, or ought
not, to have performed some action.’”); see also EAMONN BUTLER, HAYEK: HIS CONTRIBUTION
TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF OUR TIME (1983) (describing Hayek’s ideas
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Identifying who acted on behalf of society is the same type of
existential question applicable to the analysis in Citizens United. That
case raised dualistic questions—for whom does a corporation speak
and how does a corporation speak?
Consider first Justice Stevens, whose Citizens United dissent
challenged the basic idea that corporations should be protected as
political speakers:
It is an interesting question “who” is even speaking when a
business corporation places an advertisement that endorses or
attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the
customers or employees, who typically have no say in such
matters. It cannot realistically be said to be the shareholders,
who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions of
the firm and whose political preferences may be opaque to
management. Perhaps the officers or directors of the
corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking,
except their fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from
using corporate funds for personal ends. . . . It is entirely
possible that the corporation’s electoral message will conflict
with their personal convictions.125
Corporations must speak through money or through a representative,
creating a type of ventriloquist speech.126 “Corporations speak by
spending money: they hire others to speak for them. Corporate speech
is thus an agency problem.”127 Because a corporation can engage in
only indirect speech—funding the speech of others, or speaking
through hired corporate representatives, such as a member of the
board of directors or an officer—the inherent problems of agency are
present, including delegation and alignment of interests between
principal and agent.128
Corporate political speech raises additional issues that strike at the
fundamental participatory and democratic ideals served by the First
Amendment, which is meant to protect and serve the ends of

and their significance); THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds.,
1984) (providing examples of Hayek’s contributions).
125 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
126 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1002.
127 Id.
128 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 90–95 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the
authority of corporate executives as agents of the corporation).
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democratic self-government.129 “Although they make enormous
contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of
it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed
and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in
fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.”130
In Citizens United, the majority’s opinion was premised on the
idea that corporations can speak, have a voice, and have a
viewpoint—including a political viewpoint. Justice Kennedy wrote
that through the independent-expenditure bans, “[t]he Government
has ‘muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant
segments of the economy.’”131 This same imagery of a corporate
voice within the political arena was continued throughout the opinion
with language such as: “[b]y suppressing the speech of manifold
corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents
their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising
voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”132 An
important assumption that corporations can speak with a singular
voice, have a singular intent, and can engage in the same type of selffulfillment and self-expression activities as an individual underlies the
Court’s analysis.
Certainly from a literal perspective, a corporation can amass and
spend money, and spending money is a recognized form of protected
speech under the First Amendment.133 Therefore, it logically follows
that a corporation can speak. While a corporation can speak by
spending money, the assumption that a corporation can speak with a
singular voice is flawed. Except for single-shareholder corporations,
the idea that corporations can speak with a singular voice is subject to
same collective-intent criticisms levied against legislative history.134
129 See supra note 119 (discussing the argument that profit-oriented speech warrants
differential treatment under the First Amendment on the ground that it does not advance the
goals of liberty and self-realization served by “pure” forms of free speech)
130 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
131 Id. at 907 (majority opinion) (second alternation in original) (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 See id. at 898 (applying the same strict scrutiny framework for restrictions on corporate
speech as individual citizens’ speech); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)
(holding that while governmental restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns
and contributions did not violate the First Amendment, similar restrictions on individual
expenditures in campaigns did).
134 See Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1462 (2007) (describing
how, starting in the 1980s, “textualist” interpretation of statutes criticized traditional canons of
statutory interpretation as creating new legal fictions); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Text,
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994)
(outlining propositions in support of statutory text and structure as the proper foundation for
statutory interpretation); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM.
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In the corporate context, the problems of group speech can be
summarized using three main group phenomena: boundaries,
aggregation, and leadership.135 Focusing on boundaries, the collective
intent of a group decision can be challenged because
the boundaries of a group can profoundly affect the
legitimacy of speech or other actions on “its” behalf. A group
defined too broadly may have permanent minorities within it
that have needs or wills that are never met; one defined too
narrowly will tend to ignore the interests and desires of those
outside it.136
Aggregation is also a problem because the decision of the group may
be different from the decision of the individuals comprising the
group. Finally, the problem with leadership is that those driving an
organization may have a disparate, more powerful voice than the
individual members. This concern certainly reflects the reality of
corporate governance where the voice of the board of directors (and
even institutional shareholders in publically-held companies) can
easily overpower the voice of any single shareholder.
Corporate law principles recognize that group decision making has
limitations and that corporations contain multiple, and often disparate,
voices. As a threshold matter, political expenditures and contributions
are management decisions decided by a vote of the board of directors
or delegated to management, but are not subject to shareholder
votes.137 Political expenditure decisions—as directors currently

L. REV. 673, 684–85 (1997) (discussing the textualist critique of legislative intent in statutory
interpretation); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930)
(discussing the difficulty of ascertaining legislative intent because of the impossibility of
knowing the intent of each individual legislator); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989) (arguing that legislative
intent will be better determined not by the judicial system, but by legislative agencies); Kenneth
A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (arguing that legislative intent is an unsound and unpredictable
approach to statutory interpretation).
135 See Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1021 (“[C]onstitutional law largely ignores the
special character of corporate speech. At most, it treats corporate speech as an instance of
ordinary group speech . . . . [But] many of the problems of group speech are well known. . . .
[They include] the boundary problem, the aggregate problem, and the leadership problem.”
(footnote omitted)).
136 Id. at 1022.
137 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a), 151–153, 157, 161, 166 (2001 & Supp.
2008) (delineating the general powers of the board of directors with respect to issuance of stock
and shareholder rights); Grimes v. Alteon Inc., 804 A.2d 256, 260 (Del. 2002) (“One must read
in pari materia the relevant statutory provisions of the Corporation Law. First there is the
fundamental corporate governance principle set forth in 8 Del. C. § 141(a) that the ‘business and
affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by and under the direction of’ the board of
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implement them—therefore lack the approval or dissent of the
citizen-shareholders,138 and there is no mechanism for shareholders to
obtain detailed information regarding corporate political expenditures
absent voluntary disclosures. Nonetheless, the Court in Citizens
United specifically rejected the government’s argument that
protecting dissenting shareholders warranted the ban on independent
campaign expenditures.139 The Court reasoned that the “procedures of
corporate democracy” were sufficient to protect any dissenting
shareholder from supporting incongruent political speech.140
Without engaging in a discussion of the efficacy of shareholder
democracy or shareholder protection mechanisms,141 it is worth
directors. One then turns to the board’s role in stock issuance set forth in the relevant sections of
Subchapter V of Title 8. The provisions in this Subchapter relate to the issuance of capital stock,
subscriptions for additional shares, options and rights agreements. Taken together, they are
calculated to advance two fundamental policies of the Corporation Law: (1) to consolidate in its
board of directors the exclusive authority to govern and regulate a corporation’s capital
structure; and (2) to ensure certainty in the instruments upon which the corporation’s capital
structure is based.” (omission in original)); Corporate Governance After Citizens United:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 66 (2010) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Michael
Klausner, Nancy and Charles Munger Professor of Business and Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School) (“What can shareholders do under the governance regime if they would like to
influence management’s use of corporate funds for political activities? The answer is ‘not
much.’ Management will control corporate speech just as it controls other expenditures.”).
138 Recent legislative proposals suggest that this may change. See, e.g., Shareholder
Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that would require a budget for corporate political
expenditures to be preapproved by a shareholder vote at the annual meeting and a subsequent
report filed with the SEC detailing the political contributions and expenditures made); see also
Susan M. Liss, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Forward to CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE
CAMPAIGN SPENDING: GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE 3, 3 (2010), available at http://
www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/corporate_campaign_spending_giving_shareholders_a
_voice/ (suggesting a series of reforms to the corporate campaign-finance regulations that would
require a shareholder vote to approve corporate political spending and increased disclosure of
actual expenditures and contributions made).
139 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (comparing the limitations on
corporate political expenditures to a limitation on political speech of media corporations, which
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment).
140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 794 (1978)). By “corporate democracy procedures,” the Court was referring to the powers
of shareholders to elect the board of directors who then make the decision about political
expenditures and contributions. The idea is that unpopular expenditures could result in removal
of the director(s) from the board so that shareholders have an indirect voice or vote in the
decisions regarding political expenditures. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128, at 232–
40 (discussing shareholder voting and the election of directors).
For a discussion on the threat of compelled speech, see infra Part IV.C.
141 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 835 (2005) (arguing that shareholders’ existing power to replace directors is
insufficient to secure the adoption of value-increasing governance arrangements that
management disfavors and suggesting an alternative regime that would allow shareholders to
initiate and adopt rules-of-the-game decisions to change the company’s charter or state of
incorporation); see also Hearings, supra note 137, at 66 (statement of Prof. Michael Klausner)
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noting that corporate law has mechanisms outside of traditional
shareholder elections that recognize the disparate and heterogeneous
voices of shareholders. Two examples are shareholder derivative suits
and, for publically traded corporations, shareholder proxy proposals.
Shareholder derivative suits demonstrate that corporate democratic
procedures cannot address all shareholder concerns; they are, as noted
above, an alternative avenue outside of the traditional voting rights
designed to facilitate director accountability to shareholders. Through
derivative suits, corporate law recognizes an exception to traditional
standing requirements by allowing an aggrieved shareholder to bring
an action not in her name, but on behalf of the corporation.142 In
derivative suits, the plaintiff-shareholder is allowed to usurp a power
otherwise delegated exclusively to the board of directors—the power
to decide whether to bring a lawsuit. And because the plaintiffshareholders may allege mismanagement by the board, shareholder
derivative suits act as another form of shareholder control over the
board of directors in addition to traditional shareholder democracy
rights (e.g., the right to vote at annual meetings).
Shareholder derivative suits inform the present debate on the
fallacy of a singular corporate vote. Derivative suits recognize the
voice of even a single dissenting shareholder within a large
corporation and give that shareholder the right to challenge the
directors about the management of the corporation (owned by the
shareholders), although their challenges must still be plausible enough
to survive a motion to dismiss brought by the corporation.143

(“The only tool available to shareholders to influence management’s political expenditures is
their right to vote annually for nominees to the company’s board of directors. That mechanism,
however, is poorly designed for this purpose. It does not allow shareholders to exert any sort of
advance approval power. Nor does it realistically allow shareholders to vote out of office
directors whom they believe, after the fact, have allowed management to misallocate corporate
funds for political activities.”).
142 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128, at 191–202 (describing the procedural aspects of
derivative litigation including standing, holding, and representation requirements for
shareholders to usurp management power and bring litigation in the corporation’s name).
143 See, e.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCN, 2010 WL 1838968 (Del. Ch. May
3, 2010) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a stockholder derivative and
auditing action alleging that a billing scheme in a family company benefitted certain members
of the board without benefitting other stockholders); In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig.,
No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) (granting the defendant’s motion to
dismiss because the plaintiffs could not show conflicts of interest in the disputed transactions);
Case Fin., Inc. v. Alden, No. 1184-VCP, 2009 WL 2581873 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2009) (holding
that parent corporation had standing to bring derivative suit against director of subsidiary
because director had a minimum duty to report certain transactions to the parent company); In re
Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding that directors
were not entitled to a stay in favor of a simultaneously filed federal suit because the plaintiffs
properly pleaded wasteful spending); In re Affiliated Computer Serv., Inc. S’holders Litig., No.
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Derivative suits are not one of the traditional mechanisms of
corporate democracy; they are employed when that process has
allegedly broken down. The Court’s analysis in Citizens United did
not acknowledge that disparate voices may exist within a
corporation144 or that corporate law mechanisms actually recognize
these dissenting voices.
Derivative suits dispel the notion that corporations can speak with
a singular voice—the fallacy that a corporation can have a political
opinion or even a cohesive political agenda. The disparate voices of
shareholders, or even a single shareholder, are given a platform in
derivative proceedings, but the paradigm envisioned in Citizens
United ignores these voices. While derivative suits exemplify the
fallacy of a single corporate voice, they do not present a reasonable
remedy for the dissenting shareholder with regard to corporate
political expenditures. A derivative suit could prevent future
corporate political speech only if the plaintiffs proved that such
speech constituted a breach of fiduciary duty (i.e., failure to serve the
profit-maximization principle) or waste of corporate assets. The high
costs of such suits and their low success rate make them an
unattractive and unrealistic remedy, even for claims that could
survive the business judgment rule and the accompanying procedural
roadblocks.145
2821-VCL, 2009 WL 296078 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2009) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for failure
to show that the action demanded on behalf of the directors was futile, or that demand futility
was excused); McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding that although
certain provisions of the defendant’s certificate of incorporation limited directors from personal
liability, the plaintiffs had stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment); In
re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 1956-CC, 2008 WL 762482 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2008)
(holding that it was appropriate to stay a shareholder derivative action to allow the defendant to
investigate claims and issues and determine which action was in best interest of shareholders);
Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that the court had personal
jurisdiction over corporation’s outside counsel in an action against the board of directors and
outside counsel for breach of fiduciary duty and wasteful spending); Melzer v. CNET Networks,
Inc., 934 A.2d 912 (Del. Ch. 2007) (granting shareholders access to documents that could
establish a sustained or systematic failure of the board to establish oversight and thus establish
demand futility); Brandin v. Deason, 941 A.2d 1020 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying the defendantofficers’ motion to stay in an action alleging breach of fiduciary duty by engaging in scheme to
backdate stock options).
144 The potential for disparate voices within a corporation occurs whenever there is more
than one shareholder or entity holding shares. This situation occurs with both privately held and
publically traded corporations.
145 See generally Tucker Nees, supra note 2, at 205–06 (highlighting the obstacles to a
successful shareholder derivative suit); see also supra note 143 (discussing the procedural and
substantive barriers to bringing a successful shareholder derivative suit).
Simply because shareholder derivative suits are not a viable citizen-shareholder remedy
for compelled speech, does not necessarily reduce the threat that they pose to a corporation in
encouraging profit-maximizing policies, even in the context of political expenditures, because of
the costs of these suits in terms of reputation harm, litigation defense expenses, and time.
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Another corporate law mechanism that recognizes the diverse and
disparate voices of a corporation’s shareholders is the shareholder
proxy proposal.146 The proxy-proposal process, as outlined in Rule
14a-8, gives individual shareholders the right to propose resolutions
independent from management, to have those resolutions included in
the management’s proxy statement, and to have the remaining
shareholders vote on the resolution at the annual meeting.147 The
efficacy of shareholder proxy proposals as a mechanism of
meaningful control over the board of directors is questionable.148 For
this Article’s purpose, what is important is that shareholder proxy
proposals are another example of corporate law recognizing the
disparate voices of shareholders and acknowledging that the
traditional corporate democracy mechanisms (i.e., voting at the
annual meeting) have limitations.
Corporate law recognizes the disparate and heterogeneous voices
of shareholders within a corporation through mechanisms such as
shareholder derivative suits and shareholder proxy proposals. The
Supreme Court’s crucial assumption in Citizens United that
corporations can speak with one voice and that management decisions
(such as corporate expenditures) can represent the collective intent of
the shareholders is inconsistent with the legal and regulatory realities
of corporate law. In evaluating the constitutional role of corporate
political speech in our electoral process, it seems disingenuous to
engage in a discussion that is devoid of a corporate law context. By
examining corporate political speech rights in a vacuum, the Court
insulated the discussion from the complexities of how corporations
are conceptualized and regulated in practice. And it is only in such a
vacuum that broad, sweeping overgeneralizations—such as the
Court’s recognition of a singular corporate voice—can be made.
Believing that there is a singular corporate voice was an important
146 For an overview of the rules governing—and litigation related to—the shareholder
proxy-voting system, see LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAWS
128–37 (3d ed. 2007).
147 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010) (requiring management to include a shareholderinitiated proposal in the proxy statement anytime the proposal is a proper matter for
consideration under the laws of the state of incorporation); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS 214–18 (2d ed. 2006) (pointing out that a shareholder
proposal may be excluded if it: (1) is improper under state law, (2) would violate any law to
which it would be subject if implemented, (3) is materially false or misleading, (4) represents a
personal grievance or special interest, (5) is not significantly related to the issuer’s business, (6)
is something the issuer lacks the power to implement, (7) deals exclusively with the issuer’s
ordinary business operations, (8) deals with election to the issuer’s board of directors, (9) relates
to specific amounts of cash dividends, (10) contradicts a proposal submitted by the issuer at the
same meeting, (11) has already been substantially implemented, (12) substantially duplicates
another submitted proposal, or (13) is a resubmission of a previously unsuccessful proposal).
148 See HAZEN, supra note 147, at 212 (“[S]hareholder proposals typically fail miserably”).
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stepping-stone on the Court’s path to concluding that corporate
political speech and individual political speech are indistinguishable.
C. Threat of Compelled Speech
Corporate political speech is distinguishable from individual
political speech because when a corporation engages in political
speech, there is a threat of compelled speech. From a corporate law
perspective, Citizens United leaves shareholders, particularly those of
mutual funds,149 without meaningful control over how their
investments are utilized in the political arena. Investors are in the
unhappy position of potentially choosing between political integrity
and economic gain. Blurring the lines between the economic and
political interests of both corporations and citizen-shareholders
undermines the First Amendment principles supposedly advanced in
Citizens United. Comingling citizens’ economic and political interests
also undermines the system of checks and balances on management
control and accountability to shareholders that corporate law, like our
political system, strives to maintain.150
The Court extended full First Amendment protection to corporate
political speech by recognizing, in part, the freedom of association
rights of the citizen-shareholders. The Court reasoned that restricting
corporate speech would also restrict the voices of the individual
shareholders, who simply chose to join a for-profit organization
instead of another type of organization.151 This reasoning reflects the
Court’s assumption that when corporations speak they communicate a
cohesive message that reflects the interests of the individual
shareholders. Freedom of association is protected only if the citizen149 The individual mutual fund investor finances the underlying corporations’ political
speech by providing the money with which the mutual fund purchases the corporations’ stock.
But because the mutual fund itself is the corporations’ shareholder, it is the mutual fund that has
the right to bring a derivative action or offer a proxy proposal, not the individual mutual fund
investor.
150 See Tucker Nees, supra note 2, at 203 (“Discerning this fine balancing point between
the two competing interests of director accountability and director authority has been a longstanding, although elusive, goal of corporate law.”); see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1934) (discussing the
separation of ownership and control and the concentration of economic power in modern
economies); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 785–86 (2006) (advocating for the authority-versus-accountability
balance established in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)); Ann
M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability in Shareholder
Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 43–44 (2008) (discussing accountability and the
principal-agent relationship in the corporate context).
151 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906–07 (2010) (stating that a ban on corporate
expenditures “permits the Government to ban the political speech of millions of associations of
citizens”).
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shareholder’s political interests align with those of the corporation, as
determined by the board of directors and dictated by profitmaximization principles.
A second, broader criticism of the Court’s assumptions regarding
the singular corporate voice and freedom of association is that
corporate speech does not reflect the view of any citizen-shareholder:
The shareholders in whose interests corporations must speak
are not the human beings who own (or, more often, on whose
behalf other institutions own) the shares. Indeed, they are not
citizens at all, but rather moments in the market, legal
abstractions that have interests quite different from those of
real citizens in their full complexity. Unlike real people, the
fictional shareholder is an entirely one-sided abstraction; it
seeks to increase the value of its shares without regard for any
other value. Corporations, then, when they act as they are
supposed to, pursue only one goal of the many that are
important in a civilized society. Corporate agents, in short,
work for a principle, not a principal.152
Under this view, the corporation is improperly given a voice
independent from all of its citizen-shareholders; the artificial entity is
allowed full participation rights separate from the input or influence
of any of its citizen-shareholders.153 Without the guarantee that the
political speech of the corporation comports with its members’
opinions, the potential for perversion of the message is evident. This
distortion argument is distinguishable from Austin’s antidistortion
rationale, which Justice Kennedy rejected in Citizens United. Here,
the potential distortion does not stem from the ability to amass wealth
from the marketplace; rather, it stems from the fact that the
aggregation of citizen-shareholder voices gives weight to a “body”
that does not actually exist.
The majority in Citizens United brushed aside concerns over the
dissenting shareholder as a justification for the corporate independent
expenditure ban. The Court was confident that shareholder democracy
and a ready-made secondary market would be sufficient remedies for
an aggrieved shareholder who disagrees with a corporate political
expenditure and who does not want her investment used to promote a
political agenda inconsistent with her own.154 But simply relying on
152 Greenwood,

supra note 15, at 1003.
supra note 119 (arguing that profit-motivated speech lacks the crucial connections
with individual liberty and self-realization that accompany personal speech).
154 Therefore the Court felt that § 441b was both under- and overinclusive with respect to
153 Cf.
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the existing mechanisms of corporate democracy does not eliminate
the threat of compelled speech to the dissenting shareholder, nor does
it eliminate the risk of putting investors in a double bind.
Additionally, the ability to sell one’s shares presents a false choice for
investors and exerts no shaping pressure on corporate political
expenditures.
Citizens United is an influential decision that affects not only the
democratic landscape of our society, but also directly impacts the
rights of the nearly 150 million Americans that own stock.155 Stock
ownership is no longer a voluntary activity reserved for the upper
class. With the reduction in pension plans and the proliferation of taxdeferred employer retirement accounts, nearly half of all Americans
own stock; almost eighty percent of whom are invested in mutual
funds, primarily through tax-deferred accounts.156 The rapid rise in
stock ownership has been fueled by the proliferation of definedcontribution retirement plans provided by employers. 157

the shareholder-protection rationale. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
As to the first, if Congress had been seeking to protect dissenting
shareholders, it would not have banned corporate speech in only certain media within
30 or 60 days before an election. A dissenting shareholder’s interests would be
implicated by speech in any media at any time. As to the second, the statute is
overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including nonprofit corporations and
for-profit corporations with only single shareholders. As to other corporations, the
remedy is not to restrict speech but to consider and explore other regulatory
mechanisms.
Id.
155 For a discussion of the increase in bond and equities ownership in America, see INV.
CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASSOC., EQUITY AND BOND OWNERSHIP IN
AMERICA (2008), available at www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_08_equity_owners.pdf. In 1989, when
equity ownership in America was first calculated, thirty-two percent of American households
owned stocks or bonds. As of the first quarter of 2008, forty-seven percent of households in
America—approximately 54.5 million citizens—owned stocks or bonds, falling from a peak of
fifty-three percent in 2001. Id. at 9; see also J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 2:30 (2009), available at Westlaw SECIDUSL (“There are four
primary means by which individuals may own stock. Thirty-four million directly own shares in
publicly traded companies. Twenty seven million own shares in equity mutual funds outside of
retirement saving plans and pension accounts; some of these individuals also own stock directly.
Nearly 34 million own equity through self-directed retirement plans such as Individual
Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans or 401(k) plans, and 48 million own equity through defined
contribution pension plans. There is substantial overlap among these four methods of
shareownership. When this overlap is accounted for, a total of 84 million shareowners hold
stock through at least one of these channels, and three million hold stock through all four
channels.”).
156 See INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASSOC, supra note 155, at 32
(explaining that forty-three percent of stockholding Americans with investments in mutual funds
hold bond-based mutual funds and forty-five percent hold hybrid mutual funds).
157 See id. at 15 (“Ownership inside tax-deferred accounts accounted for most of the
increase in the 1989 to 2001 period and has since remained steady, which implies that most of
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Consequently, a significant portion of the voting population is at risk
of being put in a double bind as a result of the Court’s sanctioning of
corporate political speech. Citizen-shareholders may have to choose
between fidelity to a political ideal and pursuit of economic
advancement.
With mutual fund ownership, the additional distance between the
investor and the first-tier158 corporation’s managers who make the
political expenditures exacerbates the tenuous influence that
shareholders exert over directors. The increased distance between
shareholders and decision makers makes it less likely that
shareholders would even be aware of the corporation’s political
expenditures. Additionally, the indirect ownership of first-tier
corporate stock by mutual fund investors makes them ineligible to
bring derivative suits or to suggest proxy proposals.159
The more immediate remedy would be for the dissenting
shareholder, whether a direct shareholder or a mutual fund investor,
to sell her shares and withdraw her financial support from the
personally objectionable message.160 As private stock ownership

the decline since 2001 occurred outside tax-deferred accounts. Tax-deferred accounts include
employer-sponsored retirement plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).”); see also
Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud Buyers
of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and Reasoning of Stoneridge,
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 352 (2010) (“At one time, a relatively small segment of the public
invested in publicly-traded securities. Now a significant proportion of the U.S. population owns
publicly-traded stocks, either directly or indirectly. A major trend in the investment world has
been the remarkable growth of stock ownership through defined-contribution retirement plans.
Additionally, there has been even more remarkable growth in mutual funds.” (footnotes
omitted)).
158 First tier manager refer to the board of directors for company X. Second tier refers to
the management of the mutual fund that is invested in company X.
159 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128, at 194–96 (discussing the contemporaneous
ownership requirement to establish standing for a derivative suit which requires that the plaintiff
in a derivative action be a shareholder of named company defendant at the time when the
complained of act or omission occurred through the time of judgment); see also John A.
Haslem, Why Have Mutual Fund Independent Directors Failed as “Shareholder Watchdogs”?,
J. INVESTING, Spring 2010, at 7 (arguing that independent mutual-fund directors have failed
shareholders in their role as “shareholder watchdogs” under the Investment Company Act of
1940); John A. Haslem, What Mutual Fund Investors Should Have: Normative Transparency of
Disclosure (Oct. 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1287483 (arguing that increased mutual-fund disclosure requirements would help serve the
shareholder-watchdog function of independent directors under the Investment Company Act of
1940); cf. Miguel A. Ferreira et al., The Geography of Mutual Funds: The Advantage of Having
Distant Investors (Univ. of S. Cal. Marshall Sch. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Paper No. FBE
07-10, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571838 (arguing that mutual funds and
other investment vehicles with increased owner/management distance create an environment
that allows the fund to take more risk and enjoy higher performance).
160 Justice Scalia described the dissenting shareholder’s situation in his dissent in Austin in
the following way:
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becomes the primary vehicle for citizens to save for retirement, and as
pension plans give way to the rise of 401(k) plans as the predominant
employer-based retirement-plan vehicle, the “choice” of stock
ownership is eroded by the realities of participation in widespread
economic and social norms. Moreover, the investments available in
these plans are often severely restricted. Employer plans are often
limited to a list of approved stocks, and, even more commonly, a
limited list of participating mutual funds.161 Consequently, the choices
available to the citizen investor are often severely restricted in this
context. Even the simple decision to sell one’s stock may be
complicated or restricted by the stocks and/or funds available within
the employer’s plan.
The weakened exit remedy has as additional impact on corporate
political speech because without the ability to exit, the shareholder
cannot exert pressure on the board to align its political messages with
the views of its shareholders. “[A]n organization that as its primary
activity provides valuable and difficult-to-obtain services for its
members may then find its political activities relatively unconstrained
by the threat of exit.”162 The exit threat is not meaningful in the
context of employer-defined plans, nor does it persuade management
to shape corporate political expenditures.

[I]n joining [a for-profit corporation], the shareholder knows that management
may take any action that is ultimately in accord with what the majority (or a
specified supermajority) of the shareholders wishes, so long as that action is
designed to make a profit. That is the deal. The corporate actions to which the
shareholder exposes himself, therefore, include many things that he may find
politically or ideologically uncongenial . . . . His only protections against such
assaults upon his ideological commitments are (1) his ability to persuade a majority
(or the requisite minority) of his fellow shareholders that the action should not be
taken, and ultimately (2) his ability to sell his stock.
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686–87 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
161 See Colleen M. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
469, 477–80 (describing the contours of most 401(k) plans).
162 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1029. The weakened exit threat does not present the same
problem from other types of noncorporate associations where the organizations are constrained
in their actions by the threat of member exit.
Organizations that depend on ongoing fund raising or membership for their
support and that engage exclusively or almost exclusively in political, speech and
lobbying activities fit this model best. Exit will assure that the organization continues
to represent most members most of the time, even if it is not possible for any set of
political activities to match the opinions of all members at any time.
Id. at 1028.
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If, say, Republican shareholders disapprove of management’s
use of corporate funds to support a Democratic candidate,
their sales of shares will have no effect on management.
Indeed, management will not even know the sales occurred.
The shares will be bought by other investors who do not
know of, or are not bothered by, the expenditures.163
The obvious remedy then for incongruent personal/corporate
political speech would be for the dissenting shareholder to use the
channels of corporate democracy to elect a new board of directors.
That path is flawed if for no other reason than the time delay between
objectionable corporate political expenditures and the remedy of a
replaced board. Not only must the shareholders wait for the annual
meeting, but they must also wage a proxy contest to replace existing
board members, and possibly repeat the process over the course of
several years to change a staggered board.164 Given the time-sensitive
nature of political campaigns, this time delay and the costs associated
with waging such a contest leave citizen-shareholders without a
meaningful remedy.
The remedy of a ready-made secondary market for stock where a
dissenting shareholder can sell her shares offers little meaningful
relief, especially for the mutual fund investor. Nor do the channels of
shareholder democracy provide a real vehicle to express dissent.
Meanwhile, the threat of compelled speech is significant. Take for
example a direct investor in an oil company who opposes off-shore
drilling. If the oil company finances issue advertisements regarding
off-shore drilling and endorsement ads for candidates supporting offshore drilling, what recourse is available to the investor? As
discussed, the channels of corporate democracy may potentially
provide relief in the long term, after the shareholder’s money has
been used to finance personally objectionable political messages and
after the shareholder invests the time and money necessary to
successfully wage a contest. There is no immediate recourse,
however, for the investor—except to sell her shares, causing a
political/economic bifurcation of interests. Given the constraints of
investing within a defined plan and the fungibility of investors, the
exit solution provides neither a meaningful remedy for the investor
nor a threat to management.

163 Hearings,

supra note 137, at 67 (statement of Prof. Michael Klausner).
George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 146 (2010) (describing how staggered boards create
obstacles to stockholder action).
164 See
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If one looks at the flipside of this example, at an oil company
direct investor who supports off-shore drilling, the issue of compelled
speech becomes much more apparent. If the oil company endorsed a
candidate who opposed off-shore drilling or ran issue advertisements
against off-shore drilling, it could run afoul of the profitmaximization principle discussed above. The investor who supports
off-shore drilling has the same attenuated channels of corporate
democracy as the investor in the first example—she can try to replace
the board of directors at the next election, and she can initiate proxy
proposals related to the company’s stance on off-shore drilling. The
investor can also sell her shares, creating an economic/political
bifurcation. If this investor owns her shares directly, she has an
additional remedy; she may have grounds to challenge the company’s
political expenditures under Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., arguing that
they violate the profit-maximization principle and the business
judgment rule.165 Even though the directors would have the protection
of the business judgment rule, which would likely prevent this
challenge from succeeding,166 the dissenting shareholder would still
have a mechanism to voice disagreement and perhaps influence the
corporate political speech. The mere threat of such a suit could
influence how the company makes political expenditures, thereby
giving the dissenting shareholder a voice. When one compares the
sway of a shareholder whose political pursuits are in line with profit
maximization and to the sway of a shareholder whose political
pursuits are not, it is clear that the former wields much more influence
than the latter. Individual political agendas that align with profit
maximization will be favored. This disparity illustrates that the threat

165 As

Bainbridge notes:

[S]ome courts and commentators argue that the business judgment rule shields
directors from liability so long as they act in good faith. Others contend that the rule
simply raises the liability bar from mere negligence to, say, gross negligence or
recklessness.
The other conception one sees in the case law treats the rule as an abstention
doctrine that creates a presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims.
The court will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors’
conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule by showing that one
or more of its preconditions are lacking.
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128, at 96; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del.
2000) (“[D]irectors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or
lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot
be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process
that includes the failure to consider all materials facts reasonably available.”).
166 See Tucker Nees, supra note 2, at 225–28 (2010) (highlighting the procedural and
substantive barriers to shareholder success in derivative proceedings).
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of compelled individual speech increases when corporate political
speech also promotes profit maximization.
The threat of compelled speech is also higher for mutual fund
investors whose portfolio contains an indirect investment in the same
oil company. The mutual fund investor has even fewer remedies
available to her because of the increased distance between her and the
oil company’s board of directors. She lacks participation rights in the
channels of corporate democracy. In fact, she may not even know that
the fund is invested in the oil company or that the company is
engaged in this behavior. It is also a difficult decision to sell shares in
the entire fund due to political disagreement with one fund holding.
One might argue that the diluted remedy for the mutual fund
investor indicates a diluted harm to the investor. How harmful can the
incongruent speech be when it is only from one firm out of one
hundred composite firms comprising an index? When a significant
portion of the voting population is invested in this type of investment
vehicle, however, the aggregate effect of dissonant or incongruent
political speech is hard to ignore. An individual occurrence may seem
insignificant, but the aggregate weight of such harms warrants
consideration even if not significant to the individual. Our law
recognizes the value of aggregate harms in mechanisms such as class
action lawsuits and allowing a series of seemingly insignificant
breaches over time to constitute a material breach.167 Here too the
167 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (defining the procedural rules for class action lawsuits);
PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION
LAW § 4:14 (2010), available at Westlaw BOCL (“The most insidious type of ‘cardinal’ change
is that created by the cumulative impact of numerous changes, none of which individually
would be deemed ‘cardinal.’ Contractors refer to this financial peril as ‘death by a thousand
cuts.’ Where the cumulative effect of numerous changes is judicially determined to constitute a
‘cardinal change,’ i.e., a material breach of contract, contract performance may be ‘abandoned,’
and the financial impact remediated under common law breach of contract principles.”);
HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11:17 (1999) (discussing what
constitutes substantial impairment of value); 4 LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-612:23 (3d ed. 2006) (“Determination as to whether an
alleged breach of the installment sales contract constituted substantial impairment of the entire
contract is dependent upon a cumulative effect of the breaching party’s performance under the
contract based on the totality of the circumstances.”); 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:5 (7th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw MCLAUGHLIN
(“[I]n a diversity-based class action the separate and distinct individual claims of class members
may not be aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement . . . . The claims of each
individual class member, however, whether related or unrelated, may be aggregated. For
example, each class member may aggregate his or her own claims for compensatory and
punitive damages.” (footnote omitted)); 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 45:25 (4th ed. 2000) (“The determination whether a
nonconformity in one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract,
thereby excusing the buyer from further performance, is dependent upon the cumulative effect
of the seller’s performance based on the totality of the circumstances, which may include the
cumulative effect of a series of nonconforming installments.” (footnote omitted)); Carter Ott, In
re Tobacco II Cases: Potential Erosion of the Standing Requirement in Class Actions, 16 No. 8
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aggregate harm of incongruent political speech should be recognized
despite the minimal effect on the rights of the individual citizenshareholder.
Both direct and indirect investors face potential bifurcation of
political and economic interests and therefore are subject to the threat
of compelled speech. Relying on corporate democracy or the
economic/political bifurcation of selling one’s shares when one
disagrees with the corporation’s political speech are empty remedies.
The Court relied on the assumed efficacy of these remedies in
dismissing the argument that § 441b’s ban on corporate independent
expenditures was a necessary mechanism to protect shareholders from
compelled incongruent political speech. Stock ownership is
widespread, and the majority of investors own their stock through
employer plans with a restricted pool of stocks. The limitations of
corporate democracy, and the exacerbating effect of being an indirect
owner through a mutual fund, reveal the flaws in the Court’s
dismissal of the threat of compelled shareholder speech. The danger
of engaging in the First Amendment debate regarding corporate
political speech rights without grounding that discussion in the
context of the economic, political, and legal realities of corporations
is an opinion that rests a crucial decision with far reaching impact
upon flawed assumptions.
D. Prevalence of Regulated Speech in Corporate Law
The Court’s assertion that the law does not make distinctions
based on the identity of the speaker is patently false in the context of
corporate law; in fact a great deal of speech is regulated or compelled
based upon the corporate identity of the speaker.168 The corporate
charter filing requirements are a striking example. These, along with
the requisite continuing disclosures and securities regulations—
including registration and proxy requirements at both the state and

ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 2 (Sept. 16, 2009), available at Westlaw ANCALR
(“[F]ederal courts may adjudicate class actions in which the value of the class claims, computed
in the aggregate, exceeds $5 million; there are at least 100 class members; and there is minimal
diversity of citizenship . . . .”).
168 Applying the First Amendment to the question of securities-related corporate speech is
complicated by its multiplicity of audiences (e.g., employees, journalists, shareholders, etc.) and
the wide range of issues involved (e.g., sale of new securities, accounting numbers, commentary
on public issues such as global warming, etc.). DRUTMAN & CRAY, supra note 17, at 46. To
state that securities-related speech is purely corporate speech about stock that is issued to
investors is a drastically oversimplified view of the situation, but one which is adopted for the
purposes of the arguments advanced above; it is perhaps also illustrative of the fallacy of both a
single corporate voice and a single corporate audience.
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federal levels—create a slew of corporate speech based solely on the
corporate identity of the entity.169 Securities regulations typically
focus on disclosure obligations or compelled speech. “Obvious
examples of this are the registration statement requirements contained
in the Securities Act of 1933 . . . . Issuers and reporting companies are
required to disclose a wide range of business and financial
information. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 further extended
reporting requirements in a variety of areas.”170
Securities regulations can be onerous, requiring registration before
a corporation can take a certain action, such as offering for sale a new
class or series of securities (stock) in the company. 171 Because of the
temporal element—compliance with a government regulation is
required before the company may speak to potential investors in the
form of a prospectus—such securities regulations can be analogized
to prior restraints, which present the greatest challenge to First
Amendment freedoms.172 Critics of securities regulations make the
argument that such regulations violate the First Amendment.
In technical-financial disclosures, as in political speech, the
government’s power to require specific disclosure is the
power to mandate the government’s version of proper
169 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2006) (establishing SEC securities registration
requirements); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2010) (setting forth required contents of articles of
incorporation). For a database of state securities registration and reporting forms, often called
“blue sky laws,” see Blue Sky Laws, SECURITIESLINKS, http://www.seclinks.com/id16.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2011).
170 Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 803 (2007).
171 For example, under the Truth in Securities Disclosure Act—section 5 of the ’33 Act—
the corporation must file a registration statement with the SEC before it can offer any of the
securities for sale. “The SEC can, by administrative action or with the ‘assistance’ of court
injunctive action, engage in prior restraint of prohibited corporate disclosure.” Wolfson, supra
note 85, at 287.
Tender offers and solicitations are also subject to prior registration requirements in the
form of a Tender Offer Solicitation/Recommendation Schedule 14D-9 for anyone (whether it be
the company management, a shareholder, or a potential acquirer) who solicits or makes a
recommendation regarding a tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(b)(1) (2010).
Other examples of compelled/regulated corporate securities speech are section 4(2) of the
’33 Act, which exempts nonpublic offerings from registration and restricts general solicitation
or advertising of such securities by the issuer, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); fraud and insider trading
regulations under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), 243.100; and
regulation FD, which prevents material nonpublic disclosures to certain parties unless such
disclosures are made to the public at large, Page, supra note 170, at 805.
172 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 266 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he Securities Act of 1933 and
rules, in practice, require certain corporate publications to be filed with the SEC staff for review
prior to final dissemination to shareholders. A further example of modern prior restraint is that
the SEC is empowered to go into a federal district court to obtain, upon a showing of failure to
register, misrepresentation, or fraud, an injunction against the dissemination of the corporate
publication.”).
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orthodoxy. That power interferes with all of the various
values that the first amendment presumes to advance. It
interferes with the free market’s pursuit of truth because
governments have no monopoly on that precious commodity
and, indeed, frequently have an interest in suppressing it.173
Corporate disclosures and registration requirements (securities
speech) are regulated under a listener-centered rationale, not
dissimilar from the justification used in the commercial speech
doctrine.174 The requirement that corporations file statements about
the company and the securities being offered with both state and
federal agencies is rationalized as an acceptable form of compelled
speech because it facilitates the informed and autonomous decisions
of the listeners.175 Securities-related speech could be equated with
commercial speech in that it is speech generated by a corporation and
subject to special regulations because there is an economic transaction
at the heart of the speech. Such speech, in either scenario has the
potential to corrupt the message and mislead the listener.
The First Amendment has generally been interpreted to afford
the highest protection to political speech, while allowing
restrictions on other kinds of speech, such as “fighting
words” and commercial speech (including advertising and
corporate communications associated with securities or
shareholder proxy statements, where certain forms of
corporate speech are either mandated or prohibited).176
The blurred lines between pure political speech and the profitmotivated speech of corporations in both commercial- and securitiesrelated contexts is also evident in the context of corporate political
speech, where the profit motivation shapes and informs the corporate
173 Id.

at 279.

174 Securities

markets are different from traditional product markets because of the firmspecific information that drives purchases and because the sole source of that information is
typically the firm itself. Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of
Capital Markets, 55 BROOK L. REV. 5, 37 (1989); see also Wolfson, supra note 85, at 287–88
(“Corporations sell products or services. The sale of shares of common stock or debt securities,
however, is not the sale of a corporate service or product, since a share of common stock is an
ownership interest in an organization. It carries with it certain rights to vote for the election of
directors. It represents an interest in a managerial team that will produce a future flow of
corporate earnings.”); cf. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech
and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163, 163–65 (1994) (arguing for First
Amendment protection from SEC regulations by analogizing corporate securities speech with
political speech).
175 See Neuborne, supra note 174, at 59 (describing the SEC’s regulation of primarymarket speech and its effect on investor choices).
176 DRUTMAN & CRAY, supra note 17, at 46 (footnotes omitted).
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political message, as discussed above.177 In addition to the prior
restraint elements of registration requirements, proxy statement
regulations also highlight the special treatment that corporate speech
receives based on the corporate identity of the speaker. Proxy
statements are communications to the shareholders regarding an
upcoming shareholder vote, usually before annual meetings or special
votes related to a merger, acquisition, or takeover.178
Corporate speech in the form of proxy statements is regulated
under a justification similar to that utilized for commercial speech.
“The rationale for SEC regulation of the proxy materials is that proxy
statements deal with commercial speech. Shareholders invest in the
corporation. They can make intelligent decisions to hold or sell only
if, inter alia, proxy regulation supplies them with truthful
information.”179 Such communications, however, demonstrate the
blurred lines between political speech and corporate commercial
speech because proxy statements implicate the voting rights of the
shareholders and because statements related to the election of
corporate directors also evoke corporate policies. Even standard
proxy issues related to endgame decisions about the future direction
of the corporation (i.e., mergers and acquisitions) involve more than a
pure discussion of the commodity (the stock); they evoke larger
questions of corporate policy and have implications for all corporate
stakeholders including management, shareholders, employees, and the
community at large.180 In addition, filings may include a discussion
about social responsibility, governance practices, or other issues that
can be reflected or adopted in company policies that marry economic
and political interests.181 For example, McDonalds Corporation
177 See Page, supra note 170, at 791 (describing how “numbers on a balance sheet”
influence political speech of corporations).
178 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 146, at 129 (“The thrust of the proxy system is
the mandate of full disclosure in connection with shareholders’ meetings, and such meetings are
the primary concern of state corporation law.”).
179 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 282 (footnote omitted).
180 See id. at 280–82 (describing the directors’ considerations when addressing proxy
issues). Shareholder proxy statements can be excluded to the extent that they relate to “ordinary
business operations.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). Shareholder proxy statements, however,
may not be excluded if they are concentrated on “sufficiently significant social policy issues.”
DIV. CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF LEGAL BULL. NO. 14A, SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS (2002), available at http://sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14a.htm (internal quotation
marks omitted).
181 See Wolfson, supra note 85, at 285 (“Assume a corporation lobbies for a tax decrease
on products. Full first amendment protection would appear to be granted. However, an internal
dispute over the advisability of such a program, if brought to the point of a proxy contest for
differing slates of directors, would be subject to the full range of proxy regulation.” ); see also
DAVID A. KATZ & LAURA A. MCINTOSH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UPDATE: 2009 PROXY
SEASON REVIEW AND A LOOK AHEAD TO 2010 (2009), available at http://www.directorsforum.
org/conference/materials/DF10%20%20Corporate%20Governance%20Update%202009%20Pro
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recently opposed a Humane Society shareholder proposal included in
its proxy materials that would have required the company to purchase
five percent of its eggs from suppliers who use cage-free housing
systems instead of battery cages.182
Corporate speech is subject to regulations based on the corporate
identity of the speaker; formation charter requirements and state and
federal registration requirements regarding the purchase and sale of
stock are two examples. Corporate securities speech is regulated to
protect investors from the distorting effect of the profit motivation
behind such speech and to level the playing field among investors,
even though such speech may often involve both economic and
political elements. Citizens United answered the First Amendment
question of how much protection to afford corporate political speech
without considering this and other corporate law principles.
Consequently, the Court incorrectly assumed that the law does not
treat the speech of corporations differently from that of an individual.
E. Equalization Rationale Argument
The Supreme Court in Austin upheld restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures for political speech based on the
antidistortion rationale.183 Such restrictions were justified because of
the corrosive and distorting effect of expenditures funded by the
aggregations of wealth made possible only by the unique corporate
form, and which may have no correlation to public support for the
corporation’s political speech.184 Justice Kennedy pierced the
antidistortion rationale in Citizens United with a two-pronged
approach. First, Justice Kennedy highlighted that media corporations
do not enjoy special protections under the First Amendment solely
because of the phrase “free press.”185 Second, because § 441b

xy%20Season%20Review%20And%20a%20Look%20Ahead%20to%202010%20%20Mirvis%
201-10.pdf (summariing 2009 shareholder proposals).
182 McDonald’s Corp. Sched. 14A, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/63908/000119312509081437/ddef14a.htm#toc45853_21 (last visited Jan.
17, 2011); see also B.C. Upham, McDonald’s Opposes Shareholder Proposal for Cage Free
Eggs in US, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.triplepundit.com/2010/04/mcdonaldscage-free-eggs (describing the McDonald’s board’s recommendation).
183 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
184 Id.
185 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (“There is no precedent supporting laws that
attempt to distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media
corporations and those which are not. ‘We have consistently rejected the proposition that the
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.’” (quoting
Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
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exempted media corporations, which also benefited from the ability to
amass wealth due to the unique attributes of the corporate form, it
demonstrated the insignificance of the threat of accumulation of
wealth to fund political speech.186 For Justice Kennedy, the ability of
some corporations to benefit from the corporate form and participate
in the political sphere fatally weakened the antidistortion rationale.
Additionally, due to the existence of parent corporations and mediaconglomerate corporations, Justice Kennedy argued, an exempted
media corporation could become a mouthpiece for a sister company
that would otherwise be prevented from participating in such political
speech.187
So even assuming the most doubtful proposition that a news
organization has a right to speak when others do not, the
exemption would allow a conglomerate that owns both a
media business and an unrelated business to influence or
control the media in order to advance its overall business
interest. At the same time, some other corporation, with an
identical business interest but no media outlet in its
ownership structure, would be forbidden to speak or inform
the public about the same issue. This differential treatment
cannot be squared with the First Amendment.188
For Justice Kennedy, the resulting contest between small corporations
and media conglomerates where media-related corporations have a
voice and other corporations do not—or more accurately where they
are restricted to speaking through PACs, outside of the independent
expenditure time limits, or through indirect methods such as
lobbying—created the untenable situation of differential treatment of
speakers under the First Amendment.189
In addition to analyzing the different treatment of media and
nonmedia corporations, Justice Kennedy also rejected the
antidistortion rationale on independent grounds, arguing that there
will always be disparities in the volume or reach of the speech created
based on the funding source—whether that be a wealthy individual or
186 Id. at 906 (“The law’s exception for media corporations is, on its own terms, all but an
admission of the invalidity of the antidistortion rationale.”)
187 Id. at 905 (“[M]edia corporations accumulate wealth with the help of the corporate
form, the largest media corporations have ‘immense aggregations of wealth,’ and the views
expressed by media corporations often ‘have little or no correlation to the public’s support’ for
those views.” (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (majority opinion))).
188 Id. at 906.
189 See id. at 904–07 (describing the differential treatment of small corporations and media
conglomerates).
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a well-financed unincorporated business entity such as a
partnership.190
On one hand, the Court appeared to embrace an equalization
argument as between media and nonmedia corporations, rejecting the
law in part because of its media exception, which would create
inequalities as between small corporations and media conglomerates.
On the other hand, the Court referenced the inherent unequal playing
field in any marketplace, especially the marketplace of ideas, as a
reality of our economic and political system that was beyond the
reach of the government to remedy.191 In overturning Austin, the
Court returned to Buckley’s rejection of the equalization argument.192
The equalization-of-voices argument that the Court brushed aside
in Citizens United, however, is a foundational element of the
securities regulations discussed above. For example, the regulation of
proxy speech is a protectionist measure undertaken for the benefit of
the small investor.193 The requirement that corporations disclose
certain information before the exercise of corporate democracy rights
compels speech of the corporation in order to make sure that the small
shareholder is equally informed and as prepared to exercise her
corporate-democracy rights as the large investor.
Proxy regulation is designed to improve the corporatepolitical leverage of the small shareholder. Yet, first
amendment doctrine does not permit a kind of egalitarian
190 Justice Kennedy wrote that the political reality of corporate participation coupled with
the independent-expenditure ban in § 441b created an asymmetry between the voice of smaller
and nonprofit corporations who cannot engage in lobbying, etc., and those who can. Id. at 907.

[T]he result is that smaller or nonprofit corporations cannot raise a voice to
object when other corporations, including those with vast wealth, are cooperating
with the Government. That cooperation may sometimes be voluntary, or it may be at
the demand of a Government official who uses his or her authority, influence, and
power to threaten corporations to support the Government’s policies. Those kinds of
interactions are often unknown and unseen. The speech that § 441b forbids, though,
is public, and all can judge its content and purpose.
Id.
191 See id. at 908 (“Even if § 441b’s expenditure ban were constitutional, wealthy
corporations could still lobby elected officials, although smaller corporations may not have the
resources to do so. And wealthy individuals and unincorporated associations can spend
unlimited amounts on independent expenditures.” (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 503–04 (2007))).
192 Austin upheld the ban on expenditures because of “the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth” in the marketplace of ideas. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
“Austin’s reasoning was—and remains—inconsistent with Buckley’s explicit repudiation of any
government interest in ‘equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections.’” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 48–49 (1976)).
193 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 283.
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treatment of speech, including proxy speech, and the small
shareholder has greater ability and opportunity to opt out of
the corporation than [an] ordinary citizen has to opt out of the
polity.194
Dismissing the equalization and antidistortion rationales as beyond
the proper scope of government intervention ignores a fundamental
corporate law principle behind the disclosure and registration
requirements in securities law. Once again, the Court’s assumptions
regarding corporate political speech do not comport with the realities
of corporate law, which are based, in part, on an equalization
rationale.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis of corporate
political speech rights in Citizens United was divorced from a
corporate law perspective and thus rested on five flawed assumptions:
(1) that the economic motivation of corporate speech, even corporate
political speech, deserves no discount; (2) that there exists a singular
corporate voice; (3) that the threat of compelled speech is
insignificant; (4) that speech is not regulated based solely on the
corporate identity of the speaker; and (5) that the equalization
rationale is inapplicable to corporate speech. By examining the
constitutional questions evoked in Citizens United through a
corporate law lens, these assumptions are shown to be false and based
on an inherently flawed conceptualization of corporations. The falsity
of these assumptions calls into question the Court’s holding that
corporate political speech cannot and should not be treated differently
from individual political speech. The Court’s inconsistent
conceptualization of corporations and application of First Amendment
arguments to corporate political speech has created a doctrine that is
subject to political and ideological undercurrents in a way that
undermines the validity of the Court’s jurisprudence in this arena. In
answering the difficult questions about the roles, rights, and
responsibilities of corporate political speech in our democratic
society, the analysis must be robust and must adhere to both First
Amendment and corporate law principles.

194 Id.

at 285 (footnote omitted).

